United Nations A/70/798–S/2016/266

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 March 2016

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 18 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the visit of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, to the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-04697 (E) 290316

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Annex to the letter dated 18 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the visit of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, to the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

18 March 2016

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest against yet another visit uncoordinated with Ukraine of the Russian President and Russian officials on 18 March 2016 to Ukraine's temporarily occupied territory — the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Attempts to celebrate the anniversary of Russian aggression against Ukraine and deceitful seizure of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are cynical, given the grave economic, social and humanitarian problems in the peninsula. In the course of the past two years, the Russian Kremlin occupants managed to bring Crimea back to Stalin's times of authoritarian rule, lawlessness and repressions. The aggressor State continues to violate human rights in the occupied territory and terrorizes dissidents. In fact, there is no freedom of speech, media or religion in the peninsula. Systemic abuses of the rights of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatar people take place on a daily basis.

The Russian Federation, as the aggressor State, its officials and illegal occupation authorities bear full responsibility for these and other violations, in accordance with the norms of international law.

These days, as it was two years ago, the whole international community has clearly condemned the aggressor State's irresponsible actions. Ukraine and all democratic nations of the world will double their efforts to free residents of the Ukrainian peninsula from the authoritarian rule of the occupation regime and to make Crimea free again.

United Nations A/70/799–S/2016/271

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 March 2016

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 21 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 March 2016, addressed to you by a representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Dânâ (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit Çevik
Permanent Representative

16-04732 (E) 290316

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 21 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to draw your kind attention to a significant development on the island. A water supply project, which has been designed to supply water from Turkey to Northern Cyprus for the purposes of domestic consumption and irrigation through a subsea pipeline constructed in the Mediterranean Sea, was put into operation on 17 October 2015.

The project is the realization of a prolonged dream of bringing water from Turkey to the island, which has a semi-arid climate, with an average annual rainfall of 500mm and limited ground water reservoirs. This high technology project, which is the first of its kind in the world, constitutes the most significant achievement in the past century on the island.

Initially, the project is expected to provide 75 million m^3 of water to Northern Cyprus annually. Within the framework of the project, the water collected at the Alaköprü Dam, constructed on the Dragon River in Anamur, Turkey, will flow via the 107 km-long pipeline, of which 24 km is at ground level, 80 km is in the Mediterranean Sea, 250 meters below sea level, and 3 kilometres is at ground level, up to the Geçitköy Dam in Northern Cyprus.

The water will be used for domestic consumption as well as for agricultural purposes. It is evident that allocating more areas for irrigated farming will help improve the standard of living in Northern Cyprus.

The yearned-for project, which also aims to benefit the whole of Cyprus, is entitled the "peace water project" by the Turkish side, which demonstrates its goodwill as well as its determination for peace and trust in the region. Both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Governments have consistently expressed their desire to provide water for Southern Cyprus, which is also suffering from water scarcity. The water supply project, when operating at full capacity, will overcome the increasing need for water on the island in the long run. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot side has not responded positively to the repeated calls of the Turkish Cypriot side to cooperate and share the water provided by Turkey.

Recently, the Greek Cypriot Representative to the United Nations, in his politically motivated letter addressed to you regarding the water supply project, repeated the unfounded Greek Cypriot allegations that "Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and aims the integration of occupied areas with Turkey". It should be duly noted that the intervention of Turkey in 1974 was inevitable in the wake of the coup d'état carried out by the junta regime in Greece with the help of Greek Cypriot collaborators in Cyprus, which sought to annex the island to Greece. In its resolution 573 (1974), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe condemned the coup d'état carried out in Cyprus and stated that the Turkish Government had exercised its right of intervention in accordance with article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. In a similar vein, none of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus refer to the legitimate intervention of Turkey, which saved the lives of Turkish Cypriots, as an "invasion" or its subsequent presence on the island as an "occupation".

It should be underlined that the Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 in accordance with international treaties. The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, in their respective capacities as two political equals, entered into a partnership, setting up a joint State. The legitimacy of the 1960 Republic lay in the joint presence and effective participation of both communities in all organs of the State. Neither of the parties had the right to rule the other or assume the right to be the Government of the other or of the island as a whole in the absence of the other in all organs of the State and Government.

The partnership Republic of Cyprus collapsed after an onslaught upon the Turkish Cypriot partner in December 1963, and ever since, there has not been a joint central administration on the island capable of representing the whole of Cyprus, either legally or factually. Each side has since ruled itself, while the Greek Cypriot side continues to claim that it is the "Government of Cyprus".

As you are well aware, in separate and simultaneous referendums, which were held on 24 April 2004 in Northern and Southern Cyprus, the United Nations Comprehensive Settlement Plan was approved by 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots, while 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected it. The separate and simultaneous referendums confirmed the fact that there exist two equal sides on the island, neither of which represents the other.

Consequently, it would be untenable to claim that there is a single authority to represent the whole island, disregarding the reality that any solution in Cyprus requires the consent of both sides and both communities.

It is amply clear from the foregoing that the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus has no legal or moral right to claim to represent or act on behalf of anyone other than the Greek Cypriot community. The "Government of the Republic of Cyprus" has no legal or moral right or jurisdiction to represent or act on behalf of the whole island or the Turkish Cypriot people, whose sole legitimate representatives are those elected under the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The water project is based on the bilateral agreement made between the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Government of the Republic of Turkey, and was also approved by the parliaments of both countries, and is thus fully legitimate.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our hope and expectation that the negotiating process that resumed on 15 May 2015 will conclude with a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue. The Turkish Cypriot side remains committed to continuing its constructive approach for a fair and lasting settlement of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014 by the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders and the established United Nations parameters, and we believe that through an intensified, results-oriented negotiation process, an agreement could be reached within months.

At a time when the two sides on the island of Cyprus are expected to avoid blame games or other negative public statements, the Greek Cypriot side should abandon contentious approaches and adopt more positive and constructive policies with a view to creating an environment conducive to the settlement of the Cyprus issue.

Both sides on the island could benefit from the water supply project, literally making it a peace water project. Establishing cooperation on this matter would pave the way for wider cooperation regarding other natural resources around the island and in the region as well. Cyprus is the common home of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, and we strongly believe that building up a bright and prosperous common future depends on the ability of both sides to coexist on the island in peace.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative

United Nations A/70/800

General Assembly

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24 March 2016

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Seventieth session
Agenda item 139

Human resources management

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Gert **Auväärt** (Estonia)

I. Introduction

1. At its 2nd plenary meeting, on 18 September 2015, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its seventieth session the item entitled "Human resources management" and to allocate it to the Fifth Committee.

2. The Fifth Committee considered the item at its 25th, 31st and 32nd meetings, on 4, 21 and 24 March 2016. Statements and observations made in the course of the Committee's consideration of the item are reflected in the relevant summary records.[1]

3. For its consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General on amendments to the Staff Rules (A/69/117);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Overview of human resources management reform: towards a global, dynamic and adaptable workforce for the United Nations" (A/69/190);

(c) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Overview of human resources management reform: mobility" (A/69/190/Add.1);

(d) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Overview of human resources management reform: performance management" (A/69/190/Add.2 and Corr.1);

[1] A/C.5/70/SR.25, A/C.5/70/SR.31 and A/C.5/70/SR.32.

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(e) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Overview of human resources management reform: the young professionals programme" (A/69/190/Add.3);

(f) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Overview of human resources management reform: assessment of the system of desirable ranges" (A/69/190/Add.4);

(g) Report of the Secretary-General on the practice of the Secretary-General in disciplinary matters and cases of possible criminal behaviour, 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 (A/69/283);

(h) Report of the Secretary-General on the composition of the Secretariat: staff demographics (A/69/292);

(i) Report of the Secretary-General on the composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff and consultants and individual contractors (A/69/292/Add.1);

(j) Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Ethics Office (A/69/332);

(k) Related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/69/572);

(l) Report of the Secretary-General on amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules (A/70/135);

(m) Report of the Secretary-General on the practice of the Secretary-General in disciplinary matters and cases of possible criminal behaviour, 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 (A/70/253);

(n) Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Ethics Office (A/70/307);

(o) Related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/70/718);

(p) Report of the Secretary-General on seconded active-duty military and police personnel (A/70/229);

(q) Related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/70/728);

(r) Report of the Secretary-General on mobility (A/70/254);

(s) Related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/70/765);

(t) Report of the Secretary-General on the composition of the Secretariat: staff demographics (A/70/605);

(u) Related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/70/764);

(v) Report of the Secretary-General on amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules (A/70/746);

(w) Related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/70/789).

II. Consideration of draft resolution A/C.5/70/L.28

4. At its 32nd meeting, on 24 March, the Committee had before it a draft resolution entitled "Amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules" (A/C.5/70/L.28), submitted by the Chair of the Committee on the basis of informal consultations coordinated by the representative of Sweden.

5. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.5/70/L.28 without a vote (see para. 6).

III. Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

6. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on amendments to the Staff Regulations and Rules[1] and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,[2]

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;[1]

2. *Endorses* the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee;[2]

3. *Decides* that staff regulation 5.3 shall be amended to read:

Regulation 5.3

Eligible staff members shall be granted home leave once in every twenty-four months. However, the Secretary-General may grant home leave once in every twelve months to eligible staff members in duty stations having the most difficult conditions of life and work under specific conditions, as approved by the General Assembly. A staff member whose home country is either the country of his or her official duty station or the country of his or her normal residence while in United Nations service shall not be eligible for home leave.

4. *Decides* that annex IV to the Staff Regulations shall be amended to read:

Repatriation grant

In principle, the repatriation grant shall be payable to staff members who have completed at least five years of qualifying service, whom the Organization is obligated to repatriate and who at the time of separation are residing, by virtue of their service with the United Nations, outside their country of nationality. The repatriation grant shall not, however, be paid to a staff member who is dismissed. Eligible staff members shall be entitled to a repatriation grant only upon relocation outside the country of the duty station. Detailed conditions and definitions relating to eligibility and requisite evidence of relocation shall be determined by the Secretary-General.

[1] A/70/746.
[2] A/70/789.

Years of qualifying service	*Staff member with a spouse or dependent child at time of separation*	*Staff member with neither a spouse nor dependent child at time of separation*	
		Professional and higher categories	*General Service category*
	Weeks of gross salary, less staff assessment, where applicable		
5	14	8	7
6	16	9	8
7	18	10	9
8	20	11	10
9	22	13	11
10	24	14	12
11	26	15	13
12 or more	28	16	14

United Nations A/70/801

General Assembly

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28 March 2016

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Seventieth session
Agenda item 140

Joint Inspection Unit

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Gert **Auväärt** (Estonia)

I. Introduction

1. At its 2nd plenary meeting, on 18 September 2015, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its seventieth session the item entitled "Joint Inspection Unit" and to allocate it to the Fifth Committee.

2. The Fifth Committee considered the item at its 24th and 32nd meetings, on 29 February and 24 March 2016. Statements and observations made in the course of the Committee's consideration of the item are reflected in the relevant summary records.[1]

3. For its consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2015 and programme of work for 2016 (A/70/34);

(b) Note by the Secretary-General on the report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2015 (A/70/716).

II. Consideration of draft resolution A/C.5/70/L.29

4. At its 32nd meeting, on 24 March, the Committee had before it a draft resolution entitled "Joint Inspection Unit" (A/C.5/70/L.29), submitted by the Chair of the Committee on the basis of informal consultations coordinated by the representative of Israel.

5. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.5/70/L.29 without a vote (see para. 6).

[1] A/C.5/70/SR.24 and A/C.5/70/SR.32.

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III. Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

6. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Joint Inspection Unit

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the Joint Inspection Unit, in particular resolutions 31/192 of 22 December 1976, 50/233 of 7 June 1996, 54/16 of 29 October 1999, 57/284 A and B of 20 December 2002, 58/286 of 8 April 2004, 59/267 of 23 December 2004, 60/258 of 8 May 2006, 61/238 of 22 December 2006, 61/260 of 4 April 2007, 62/226 of 22 December 2007, 62/246 of 3 April 2008, 64/262 of 29 March 2010, 65/270 of 4 April 2011, 66/259 of 9 April 2012, 67/256 of 12 April 2013, 68/266 of 9 April 2014 and 69/275 of 2 April 2015,

Reaffirming the statute of the Unit[1] and the unique role of the Unit as the only external and independent system-wide inspection, evaluation and investigation body,

Having considered the report of the Unit for 2015 and programme of work for 2016[2] and the note by the Secretary-General on the report of the Unit for 2015,[3]

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2015 and programme of work for 2016;[2]

2. *Takes note* of the note by the Secretary-General on the report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2015;[3]

3. *Reiterates its request* to the executive heads of the participating organizations to fully comply with the statutory procedures for consideration of the reports of the Unit and, in particular, to submit their comments, including information on what they intend to do regarding the recommendations of the Unit, to distribute reports in time for their consideration by legislative organs and to provide information on the steps to be taken to implement those recommendations accepted by the legislative organs and the executive heads of participating organizations;

4. *Reiterates its request* to the Secretary-General and the other executive heads of the participating organizations to fully assist the Unit with the timely provision of all information requested by it;

5. *Commends* the Joint Inspection Unit on the fiftieth anniversary of its founding;

6. *Stresses* the importance of the oversight functions of the Unit in identifying concrete managerial, administrative and programming questions within the participating organizations and providing the General Assembly and other legislative organs of participating organizations with practical and action-oriented

[1] Resolution 31/192, annex.
[2] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventieth Session, Supplement No. 34* (A/70/34).
[3] A/70/716.

recommendations to improve and strengthen the governance of the United Nations as a whole;

7. *Notes* the need to enhance the effectiveness of the Unit and its system-wide oversight capability;

8. *Recognizes* that the effectiveness of the Unit system-wide is a shared responsibility of the Unit, the Member States and the secretariats of the participating organizations;

9. *Also recognizes* the need to continue to enhance the impact of the Unit on the management efficiency and transparency of the participating organizations within the United Nations system;

10. *Welcomes* the coordination of the Unit with the Board of Auditors and the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the Secretariat, and encourages those bodies to continue to share experiences, knowledge, best practices and lessons learned with other United Nations audit and oversight bodies, as well as with the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, with a view to avoiding overlap or duplication and achieving further synergy, cooperation, effectiveness and efficiency, without prejudice to the respective mandates of the audit and oversight bodies;

11. *Requests* the heads of participating organizations to make full use of the web-based system of the Unit and to provide an in-depth analysis of how the recommendations of the Unit are being implemented;

12. *Invites* the Unit, as appropriate, to develop indicators to measure system-wide efficiency and effectiveness achieved as a result of the implementation of its recommendations and to report thereon in the context of its future reports;

13. *Recalls* paragraph 107 of its resolution 70/247, and reiterates its requests to the Secretary-General to consider options for hosting the Joint Inspection Unit website in-house and to report on this matter in the context of the forthcoming report on the implementation of the information and communications strategy for the Secretariat;

14. *Reaffirms* article 20 of the statute of the Unit,[1] in which it is stipulated that the Unit shall be invited to be represented at meetings when its budget estimates are being discussed;

15. *Welcomes* the continued reform efforts undertaken by the Unit to better serve the interests of the participating organizations and Member States, and encourages the Unit to continue its efforts in this regard;

16. *Reiterates its request* to the Unit to consider optimizing the number of projects in its programme of work through prioritization;

17. *Notes with concern* the long-vacant posts in the Unit, and stresses the importance of expediting all recruitment processes and filling posts in a timely manner;

18. *Reiterates its request* to the Unit to issue its reports in all the official languages of the United Nations, well in advance of meetings of the legislative organs of participating organizations so that the reports can be thoroughly and effectively utilized in their deliberations.

United Nations A/70/802–S/2016/276

General Assembly
Security Council

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24 March 2016

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 72 (b)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 22 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning the disreputable Russian court decision on the trumped-up case of Nadiya Savchenko, member of the Ukrainian Parliament, member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Ukrainian Army serviceman and political prisoner illegally detained in Russia (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the statement distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (b), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-04986 (E) 310316

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Annex to the letter dated 22 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the disreputable Russian court decision on the trumped-up case of Nadiya Savchenko

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses strong and resolute protest with regard to the so-called "verdict" of the so-called "Russian court" sentencing Nadiya Savchenko, citizen of Ukraine, member of the Ukrainian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), to 22 years in prison.

The verdict is an indisputable proof that it is useless to seek justice in modern Russia. When Russia is politically driven, it disregards the fundamental norms and principles of international law, its national legislation, humanity, justice and morality.

This unlawful decision, based on the bogus investigation, represents not the verdict to Nadiya Savchenko but to Russia itself, in which the Kremlin crushed down any fairness and justice.

Russia's brutal violation of universal norms as well as Nadiya's PACE immunity is a clear signal to the international community of the inadmissibility of violating fundamental principles and norms by the country, which is one of the United Nations Security Council permanent members.

We consider this cynical judicial farce as yet another indisputable evidence of violation of the Minsk agreements by Russian Federation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine urges Russia to immediately cancel this illegal, inhumane decision and immediately release Nadiya Savchenko. We also require setting free all illegally detained citizens of Ukraine that are political hostages and victims of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

We are confident that all those involved in framing up the case against Nadiya Savchenko will be brought to justice. To this end, Ukraine will continue working with its international partners to bring into force the "Savchenko list".

United Nations A/70/803

General Assembly

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2 May 2016

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Seventieth session
Agenda items 131 and 148

Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Report of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations and report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors concerning United Nations peacekeeping operations for the financial period ended 30 June 2015

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the financial period ended 30 June 2015 (A/70/5 (Vol. II), chap. II). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with the members of the Audit Operations Committee of the Board of Auditors, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 18 February 2016. The Committee also discussed the Board's findings with the representatives of the Secretary-General in the context of the related report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors (A/70/724). The representatives provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses dated 7 March 2016.

2. The Advisory Committee makes comments and recommendations on general and cross-cutting issues related to the findings of the Board of Auditors in section II below. Where relevant, the Committee will make further references regarding the Board's recommendations on specific peacekeeping operations in the context of its

16-02146 (E) 050516

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reports on the budget submissions of the missions concerned, as well as in its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742).

II. Report of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the financial period ended 30 June 2015

A. Scope of the audit

3. The Board audited the financial statements of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, which had been prepared in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). The financial statements comprise the statement of financial position as at 30 June 2015 (statement I), the statements of financial performance (statement II), changes in net assets (statement III), cash flows (statement IV) and comparison of budget and actual amounts (statement V) for the year ended 30 June 2015, and the notes and annexes to the financial statements. The Board states that it conducted the audit in conformity with the International Standards on Auditing and issued its report in accordance with article VII of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations.

4. The Board reviewed the peacekeeping accounts and operations of United Nations Headquarters, 15 field missions, 31 completed missions[1] and the four special-purpose accounts, namely, the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, the support account for peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy (UNLB),[2] and the Employee Benefits Funds.

B. Audit opinion

5. In the opinion of the Board of Auditors, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of United Nations peacekeeping operations as at 30 June 2015 and the results of operations and cash flows for the year then ended, and have been properly prepared in accordance with IPSAS.

C. General observations

6. The Board issued 31 recommendations, including 13 main recommendations, for the financial period 2014/15 compared with the 63 recommendations, including 21 main recommendations, issued for the financial period 2013/14. **The Advisory Committee commends once again the Board of Auditors for the quality of its report.**

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[1] The Board refers to these as "closed peacekeeping operations" and provides a list of them in annex I to its report (A/70/5 (Vol. II), chap. II). The list includes the peacekeeping missions identified in the Advisory Committee's report on the updated financial position of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2015 (A/70/829).

[2] The terms "United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB)" and "Global Service Centre" are used interchangeably. In the absence of an explicit General Assembly decision to change the nomenclature, the Advisory Committee will use the term UNLB in the context of the present report.

Financial overview

7. In paragraphs 11 to 13 of its report, the Board provides an overview of the financial position of peacekeeping operations, which, according to the Board, continues to be sound, with sufficient cash resources to sustain core operations. The Board also indicates that the approved peacekeeping budget for 2014/15 was $8.57 billion, which represented an increase of 8.6 per cent compared with $7.89 billion for 2013/14. Furthermore, expenditure for 2014/15 amounted to $8.30 billion, compared with $7.61 billion in 2013/14, which represented an increase of 9.1 per cent. The Board also indicates that expenditures for all budget groups, i.e., military and police personnel, civilian personnel, and operational requirements, as well as for UNLB and the support account, have steadily increased over the past budget periods, while voluntary contributions in kind have decreased slightly (see A/70/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, table II.2 and figure II.I).

Status of recommendations of the Board of Auditors

8. The Board of Auditors provides data with respect to the implementation of its recommendations in paragraphs 8 to 10 of its report. The Board indicates that, of the 63 recommendations issued in 2013/14, 33 (52 per cent) have been implemented, 25 (40 per cent) are under implementation, 2 (3 per cent) have not been implemented and 3 (5 per cent) have been overtaken by events. The Board also indicates that, while the Administration has indicated that 33 recommendations have been implemented, the Board has concluded that 15 of those recommendations, or 24 per cent, have been reiterated in the current report, pertaining to the period 2014/15. The Board also states that those recommendations have previously been closed, although they have yet to be fully implemented.

9. The Advisory Committee notes that a similar issue exists with respect to information and communications technology (ICT) and recalls its concern that the efforts made to redress the persistent managerial and structural issues previously identified by the Board of Auditors continued to fall well below what is deemed necessary and that little progress appeared to have been made towards the achievement of effective governance, management and operational arrangements for ICT matters in the Secretariat (see A/70/755, para. 10).

10. **The Advisory Committee notes with concern that, as indicated by the Board, if the 15 unimplemented recommendations were to be excluded from the total of 33 recommendations, the rate of implementation would fall to 28 per cent, which, in its view, is not satisfactory. In this connection, the Committee recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolution 69/249 B, requested the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors in a prompt and timely manner and to provide a full explanation for the delays in implementing all outstanding recommendations of the Board, the root causes of the recurring issues and the measures to be taken. The Advisory Committee notes that limited progress has been made in this respect and recalls that the Board has repeatedly drawn attention to persistent weaknesses on specific subject areas, including budget formulation, non-expendable property, procurement and contracting, and air operations, which continue to require greater attention in the context of peacekeeping operations (see A/69/838, para. 45).**

11. The Advisory Committee expresses its concern that the recurrence of recommendations points to systemic problems in the management of peacekeeping operations, which remain unresolved over several financial periods. The Committee recalls its previous comments that the periodic recurrence of recommendations indicates the need to reinforce internal control measures, to enhance monitoring mechanisms and to ensure stricter compliance with established rules and procedures.

Accountability in United Nations peacekeeping operations

12. The Advisory Committee notes that the Board's identification of persistent shortcomings and the repetition of audit recommendations addressing long-standing and unresolved deficiencies in successive financial periods indicate a certain lack of commitment on the part of managers. In this connection, the Committee recalls its expectation, in the context of the report of the Board for the period 2013/14, that the Secretary-General would step up his efforts to strengthen the internal control framework in peacekeeping operations (ibid., para. 45).

13. In the context of the present report, the Board specifically addresses the subject of accountability in a number of instances throughout its report, such as in the contexts of: (a) air travel, where the Board recommends that the Administration determine accountability for deviations from the rules and instructions (A/70/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, para. 78); (b) fuel, rations and supplies, where the Board observes that administrative delays caused missions to forfeit discounts in the amount of $524,670 and states that there is a need to fix accountability for losses to the Organization (ibid., para. 157); and (c) the global field support strategy, where the Board observes that the implementation of a suitable monitoring and accountability framework has been delayed (ibid., paras. 278-283). In addition, the Board points out instances of mismanagement, for example with respect to: (a) weaknesses in budget formulation and management, where the Board has continued to observe significant under- and overexpenditure, redeployments and unrealistic budget assumptions (ibid., paras. 20-34); (b) travel management, where the Board continues to note non-compliance with the Organization's 16-day advance purchase policy (ibid., para. 67-78); (c) procurement and contracting, where the Board stressed the General Assembly's request for the Secretary-General to hold staff members accountable for mismanagement and poor decision-making leading to financial loss for the Organization (ibid., para. 113); and (d) environmental protection and waste management, where the Board highlights several egregious examples that have caused environmental harm in various areas of operation (ibid., paras. 218-233).

14. With respect to the Organization's overall accountability framework, the Advisory Committee recalls its recent comments in its report on the fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat, which was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 70/255, on the need for the Secretary-General to set out measures to hold senior managers accountable for handling the risks associated with their respective areas of responsibility, including with respect to instances of general or specific mismanagement, such as the application of unrealistic budget assumptions or the implementation of costly, but unsuccessful, management initiatives (see A/70/770, para. 28). The Committee furthermore recalls its view that the necessary measures must be in place to link individual responsibilities with organizational activities, whether these pertain to day-to-day management tasks or broader institutional change

initiatives. In this connection, the Committee recommended that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to develop a clear, transparent and precise set of parameters, aimed at defining responsibility areas, particularly for senior managers, for non-compliance of these responsibility areas and to report thereon in the context of his sixth progress report on the accountability framework (ibid., para. 29).

15. **The Advisory Committee welcomes the continued focus of the Board of Auditors in particular on those areas where management weaknesses have not been properly addressed, and stresses that the Secretary-General should implement without delay specific accountability measures, particularly in areas pertaining to budget formulation, air operations, travel management and procurement.**

D. Main recommendations of the Board of Auditors on specific issues

16. In its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742), the Advisory Committee has addressed a significant number of issues highlighted by the Board of Auditors in its most recent report. The present report will therefore not address these issues again, but will instead provide cross-references, as necessary.

1. Implementation of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards

17. In paragraphs 14 to 19 of its report, the Board addresses the implementation of IPSAS and states, inter alia, in note 2 to the financial statements, that the financial statements are prepared on an accrual basis. The Board states that, while the Administration has strengthened the modalities for the preparation of financial statements of peacekeeping operations during the second year of IPSAS implementation, further improvement is needed. **The Advisory Committee concurs with the Board's recommendation and looks forward to the Board's continued engagement in the post-implementation stage of IPSAS.** The Committee has provided detailed comments on a range of IPSAS-related matters in its report on the seventh progress report on the adoption of IPSAS by the United Nations (A/69/414).

2. Budget formulation and management

18. The Board addresses matters related to budget formulation and management in peacekeeping operations in paragraphs 20 to 34 of chapter II of its report and observes that the weaknesses already highlighted in previous audits have continued to persist in the financial period 2014/15 and concern: (a) variances between appropriations and expenditure; (b) redeployments between different classes of expenditure; and (c) unrealistic assumptions used for budget projections.

19. The Board indicates that in 2014/15 peacekeeping operations expended an amount of $8.30 billion of the approved budget of $8.57 billion, equivalent to aggregate underexpenditure of $270 million, or 3.26 per cent. Across the 15 field missions, underexpenditure ranged from 0.56 per cent to 8.31 per cent. The Advisory Committee shares the Board's concern with respect to the considerable variances in the various classes and subclasses of expenditure, specifically at eight missions (the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African

Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)) and at UNLB, ranging from 5 per cent to 1,666 per cent. For example, the Board observes that at MINUSCA, an amount of $113.24 million in excess of the appropriation was incurred in 14 classes of expenditure and 43 subclasses, peaking at 1,666 per cent under one budgetary subclass, and that an amount of $139.10 million below the appropriation was incurred across 17 classes and 64 subclasses, resulting in an underutilization of 81 per cent in one instance. With respect to the formulation of budgets in peacekeeping operations, the Board concluded that the assumptions failed to take into consideration historical expenditure trends. For example, with respect to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the Board found that no budgetary provisions had been made for international general temporary assistance staff salaries during the 2013/14 and 2014/15 periods, although resources continued to be needed in both instances, and at the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), an inaccurate national staff budget assumption was used, as staff had been in their posts for a number of years and were at higher steps in their grade.

20. The Board notes that redeployments between different classes of expenditure, totalling $291.36 million during 2014/15, remain largely unchanged compared with 2013/14 levels and that, in some instances, amounts redeployed under a particular expenditure class or subclass have remained partly unutilized. In this connection, the Advisory Committee enquired as to whether, under Umoja, expenditures could be incurred that were without an appropriation or in excess of the prior appropriation. The Committee was informed that transactions in Umoja were subject to budget control checks within the system, allowing for the flexibility to spend within the operational requirements group (group III) regardless of the allotted amount at the class level, as long as the total allotment for operational costs in each cost centre was not exceeded. The Committee notes that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/307, it has begun receiving updates every six months on the nature and extent of the budgetary redeployments in missions, and that it intends to continue to analyse these reports with a view to making further recommendations to the Assembly, as necessary (see A/70/742, paras. 27-28).

21. **The Advisory Committee shares the concern of the Board of Auditors at the persistent level and frequency of redeployments among and between expenditure groups and classes in peacekeeping missions and notes that there had been no significant improvement in the level of variances between appropriation and expenditure across missions. The Advisory Committee stresses that, notwithstanding the dynamic operational environment of peacekeeping operations and a certain degree of unpredictability in projecting their operational needs, redeployments should be limited and only be permitted with adequate justification. The Advisory Committee concurs with the Board that efforts must be intensified to make budgets as realistic as possible.** The Committee provides further comments on the subject of budget formulation, including the redeployment of funds, in its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742). The Committee's recommendations pertaining to the need for improved accountability are contained in paragraphs 12 to 15 above.

3. Asset management

22. In paragraphs 35 to 66 of its report, the Board addresses matters related to asset management in peacekeeping operations, including with respect to strategic deployment stocks, continuing to observe weaknesses in that area, such as delays in writing off property, plant and equipment, in disposing of written-off assets and in monitoring ageing stock and the inability to locate assets during physical verification.

23. The Board indicates that items valued at $4.57 million could not be found during physical verification in three missions (MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNAMID). In comparison, for 2013/14, the Board observed that items valued at $3.17 million could not be located in four missions (MINUSMA, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and UNMISS).

24. With respect to MINUSCA, the Board noted the explanation that a physical inspection had been carried out by the Mission. However, no documentation was provided to the Board to support that assertion. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed by the Administration that related inventory worksheets had not been retained and that this was attributable to the difficult operating environment and inadequate capacity during the start-up phase of the Mission. Furthermore, the results of the physical verification had now been recorded in the inventory management system, and Mission management would ensure strict compliance with established inventory management procedures.

25. With respect to MINUSMA, upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed by the Administration that, as of February 2016, 22 additional items had been located, 7 items would be written off and efforts were under way to locate the remaining 71 items. On a related matter, the Board was informed that an asset review would be conducted during 2015/16 at the time of the migration of asset data from Galileo to Umoja, in accordance with paragraph 67 of IPSAS 17, which states that the residual value and the useful life of an asset shall be reviewed at least at each annual reporting date.

26. With respect to the planned replacement of the Galileo system with a related Umoja functionality by the end of 2017, the Advisory Committee was informed by the Administration, upon enquiry, that in order to ensure the transfer of valid and up-to-date data from Galileo to Umoja, the Administration planned to: (a) strengthen its asset monitoring, verification practices and property management compliance practices; (b) ensure more timely tracing of assets; and (c) improve the expeditious disposal of written-off assets.

27. The Board also highlights the issue of ageing stock, specifically with respect to strategic deployment stocks, observing that, as at 30 June 2015, of a total of 3,189 items, valued at $41.02 million, in the strategic deployment stock inventory, 1,752, or 55 per cent, were over one year old. This also included items valued at $3.37 million that, according to the Board, may become obsolete in a short timespan, such as computers, generator sets, hospital equipment, water pumps and water storage equipment, and security and surveillance equipment. Furthermore, a total of 579 items, valued at $4.37 million, had exceeded their useful life as at the time of the audit review.

28. In this connection, the Advisory Committee was informed by the Administration, upon enquiry, that in order to mitigate the risk of ageing stock, UNLB had begun, in January 2016, to offer inventory older than three years to the field missions at a value of the purchase price less the cost of replacement. These goods would be written off should they become technically obsolete or should the missions not express interest. On a related matter, with respect to the role of managing remaining strategic deployment stock inventory in the context of supply chain management and modularization, the Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that, as part of the annual strategic deployment stock composition review, the removal of modules that had not been in demand among field missions, such as the recreation and welfare module, which had not been in high demand, had also been considered.

29. **The Advisory Committee notes with concern that the issues pertaining to ageing stock at peacekeeping operations, including with respect to the strategic deployment stocks, and the inability to locate assets during physical count, are among a number of issues which have been cited repeatedly by the Board of Auditors in past financial periods. The Committee concurs with the recommendation that the Administration strengthen asset management and monitoring practices across peacekeeping operations, specifically with respect to strategic deployment stocks, where there is a need to strengthen the composition review process and to ensure regular rotation of items. In this connection, the Advisory Committee recalls its previous expectation that IPSAS and Umoja will enable improved management and oversight of assets, particularly in peacekeeping missions (see A/69/838, para. 45). Furthermore, in connection with its recent report on the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy (A/70/742/Add.9), the Committee recalls its concern that weaknesses in the management of the strategic deployment stocks have resulted in a loss of $5 million in obsolete equipment and stocks. The Committee has recommended that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to entrust the Office of Internal Oversight Services with the conduct of an audit to cover the issues raised in that report (ibid., para. 37).** On the related matter of supply chain management, the Committee provides comments on efforts in this regard in its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742).

4. Travel management

30. In paragraphs 67 to 78 of chapter II of its report, the Board of Auditors addresses matters related to travel management in peacekeeping operations, noting that in August 2014 the Advisory Committee requested the Board to conduct a comprehensive audit of official travel financed from peacekeeping budgets. The Board notes, in particular, that official travel was one of the budget classes affected by a significant amount of redeployments: the budget appropriation of $55.34 million increased to $67.58 million through the redeployment of $12.24 million from other categories of expenditure, with the highest level of redeployment in MINUSCA, MINUSMA, UNAMID and UNMISS. Upon enquiry, the Committee was provided by the Board with a table detailing related expenditures compared with the initial appropriation approved by the General Assembly for the period 2014/15 (see annex to the present report). In its report, the Board notes the explanation provided that efforts were under way for improved planning and control during budget formulation in this

regard. The Advisory Committee, however, notes that travel has been of concern to the Board for a number of years, including such matters as travel-related expenditure in excess of the approved budget, extensive non-compliance with the policy on advance purchase of tickets and non-recovery of travel advances from staff members.

31. With respect to field missions' compliance with the Organization's advance ticket purchase policy (ST/AI/2013/3, para. 3.3), the Board notes that the related performance indicator targets a benchmark of 75 per cent compliance with the requirements for booking flights 16 days in advance of travel. For the period 2014/15, the Board observes an average 52 per cent compliance rate, compared with the 48 per cent compliance rate in 2013/14. Table II.9 of the report of the Board highlights cases in which compliance rates are either inadequate or worsening over time, including at UNMIL (from a 65 per cent compliance rate in 2013/14 to 46 per cent in 2014/15); the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) (from 61 per cent to 30 per cent); and UNAMID (from 37 per cent to 38 per cent). However, the aforementioned table also shows that improvements have been made in several missions, including at the Global Service Centre (from a 56 per cent compliance rate in 2013/14 to 60 per cent in 2014/15); MINUSCA (from 16 per cent to 54 per cent); MINUSMA (from 26 per cent to 51 per cent); UNOCI (39 per cent to 64 per cent); MONUSCO (40 per cent to 61 per cent); UNDOF (33 per cent to 42 per cent); UNIFIL (56 per cent to 63 per cent); and UNMISS (47 per cent to 56 per cent). One mission, UNMIK, achieved and exceeded the 75 per cent benchmark, improving its compliance rate from 67 per cent in 2013/14 to 83 per cent in 2014/15. The Board notes that, according to the Administration, a requirement to submit travel requests 21 days prior to the departure date had been integrated into the Umoja portal travel module to ensure that travel requests are made in compliance with the advance purchase policy.

32. **The Advisory Committee notes the efforts made to improve rates of compliance with the advance ticket purchase policy. The Committee concurs with the Board on the need to strictly enforce this policy and emphasizes that efforts should continue in order to meet the 75 per cent benchmark across all peacekeeping operations.**

33. The Board notes that, according to staff rule 7.4, all official travel, not including exceptional cases, must be authorized in advance. It highlights MINUSMA, in which 41 travel cases costing $134,346 were not authorized at all, and 406 cases costing $1.29 million were authorized ex post facto. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Mission had acknowledged administrative delays and that the travel authorizations for the aforementioned 41 cases had subsequently been approved ex post facto. The Committee was also informed that MINUSMA had strengthened its procedures relating to the approval of travel authorizations and that, effective 9 November 2015, with the deployment of Umoja Extension 1, the travel approval process had been further streamlined.

5. Air transportation

34. The Board of Auditors addresses matters related to air transportation in peacekeeping operations in paragraphs 83 to 111 of chapter II of its report. The Board continues to highlight the underutilization of air assets in terms of flight hours and passenger and cargo capacity, as well as deficiencies in strategic planning and coordination of strategic flights. The Board notes that, in 2014/15, the aviation fleet consisted of 55 fixed-wing and 150 rotary-wing aircraft, observing that a persistent mismatch remained between the flight hours available and those actually required or utilized. The Board notes that the aircraft were not utilized for more than 50 per cent of the contracted days but that, as shown in table II.12 of its report, the utilization of air assets with respect to budgeted flying hours improved from approximately 80 per cent in 2013/14 to 86 per cent in 2014/15. In addition, with respect to UNAMID and MONUSCO, the Board concluded that both missions used only 43 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively, of their contracted flight hours. The Board observed that there appeared to be scope for optimizing the number of leased unmanned aerial vehicles, thereby reducing costs without compromising operational requirements. In addition, the Board points out that its analysis of aviation reports showed 180 instances of potential overpayment due to inconsistencies in reporting, in which the days when aircraft were not available had not been excluded from the number of days of aviation support. However, the Board was unable to estimate the potential overpayments, as no details relating to the contractual terms were made available.

35. In its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742), the Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to expedite completion of an assessment of the roles and responsibilities of the offices handling the management and oversight of air operations for peacekeeping missions and report comprehensively thereon in his next overview report (para. 131). **The Advisory Committee concurs with the recommendation of the Board that the Administration urgently investigate the 180 instances cited above and effect recoveries, if due, from the contractors.** In this connection, the Advisory Committee provides its comments on air operations, including on the utilization of air assets, unmanned aerial systems, and the role of the Strategic Air Operations Centre, the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre and the aviation information management system, in its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

6. Procurement and contracting

36. In paragraphs 112 to 168 of chapter II of its report, the Board of Auditors addresses matters related to procurement and contracting in peacekeeping operations and continues to observe weaknesses in the conduct of procurement activities, including with respect to bidding requirements, established tendering processes, lack of competitive bidding, non-levying of liquidated damages, non-adherence to provisions relating to performance bonds and deficient contract management. The Board observes these weaknesses in several operational areas, including with respect to the leasing of aircraft and the purchase of materials for construction and for airfields, such as a rapidly deployable landing mat system for the development of helipads, as well as with respect to the engagement of Internet service providers. The Board also observes that there is a need to improve and coordinate regional procurement activities, including proper utilization rates of regional acquisition plans and systems contracts, which are coordinated by the

Regional Procurement Office, located in Entebbe. While the average utilization of regional systems contracts has improved, from 32 per cent in 2013/14 to 35 per cent in 2014/15, the Board continues to highlight their underutilization. **The Advisory Committee concurs with the Board of Auditors on the need to consolidate the common requirements of individual missions into regional systems contracts to achieve economies of scale and notes with regret that, despite repeated observations and recommendations of the Board on this matter, the Administration has been able to show only a slight improvement in this area.**

37. The Board also reiterates the need to adhere to the stipulations of the Procurement Manual, recommending that the Administration provide training and guidance, and strengthen oversight and internal controls. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Secretary-General considered that the recommendation on procurement training had been implemented, with a number of on-site and online training courses, the launch of the online Procurement Training Campus offering mandatory courses for all procurement staff and specialized courses for staff performing procurement-related functions. According to the Secretary-General, with the increase in procurement-related training, the number of procurement-related findings by the Board had continuously decreased. **The Advisory Committee supports the efforts with respect to procurement training but is of the view that the main concerns which have repeatedly been put forth by both the Board of Auditors and the Committee have remained largely unaddressed in several areas, including in those noted above. The Advisory Committee continues to stress the need for closer monitoring of compliance to ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the Procurement Manual and other procurement rules and procedures and expects that the Secretary-General will continue with his efforts to ensure the full implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors.** The Committee has provided comments and recommendations on the role of the Regional Procurement Office, as well as other matters, such as the role of procurement training and compliance monitoring, in its report on United Nations procurement activities (A/69/809).

7. Medical services

38. Matters related to medical services are addressed in paragraphs 209 to 217 of chapter II of the report of the Board of Auditors. The Board identifies a number of areas for improvement in the provision of medical services at various missions, including inadequate or non-existent medical facilities, deficient procurement practices relating to medical supplies and delays in the roll-out of a hospital management system. For example, at MINUSCA, the Board observed that hospital and clinic facilities had not been established on time or at all and that one aeromedical evacuation team could not deploy, as aircraft facilities had not been completed. At MINUSTAH, the Board notes extensive delays in the delivery of medical supplies.

39. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the timely establishment of adequate medical facilities and the availability of medical supplies are indispensable and vital for peacekeeping operations so as to ensure proper medical care for civilian, military and police personnel in the field, in particular those stationed in volatile and dangerous conditions. The Committee therefore concurs with the Board that missions must ensure the optimal utilization of available resources for medical support to field personnel.** The

Advisory Committee provides further comments on medical services in the context of its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742), noting that it intends to keep this matter under review.

8. Management of construction projects

40. In paragraphs 169 to 182 of chapter II of its report, the Board of Auditors addresses matters related to the management of construction projects, identifying a number of unresolved issues, including delays in the commencement and completion of construction projects, as well as in the finalization of contracts. The Board indicates that the delays occurred as a result of poor planning and timing of projects, lack of proper selection of contractors and insufficient monitoring of contractual compliance. The Board recommended the preparation of realistic annual construction plans, strengthening the process of evaluation and selection of contractors, and enforcing execution of contracts in accordance with the contractual stipulations. The Advisory Committee comments further on construction-related matters in general in its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742).

9. Environmental protection and waste management

41. In paragraphs 218 to 233 of chapter II of its report, the Board of Auditors addresses matters related to environmental protection and waste management in peacekeeping operations. The Board highlights several problematic areas and notes, for example, the presence at UNMIL of waste, including old batteries, 420 communications and information technology equipment, 28 supply assets in sea containers, 112 scrap vehicles, 3,850 used tires and 100 broken pieces of furniture. In addition, 51,000 litres of used oil and lubricants were found in an open yard, where they had been located for an extended time period.

42. The Board notes that, according to the Administration, in response to its audit recommendations the Department of Field Support had entered into a consultancy agreement with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) costing $6.95 million. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed by the Administration that UNEP would provide a technical assistance team for all peacekeeping missions during a three-year period and would provide expertise to reduce the environmental footprint. A core team, to be based at the UNEP office in Geneva, and a roving technical assistance team would have expertise in environmental management systems; greenhouse gas emissions reporting; field logistics; procurement and system contracts; solar power; energy efficiency; solid waste management (including hazardous waste); and water and wastewater.

43. **The Advisory Committee concurs with the Board that poor storage practices and delays in the disposal of waste are contrary to the purpose and intent of the environmental and waste management policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support and on the need to address this issue as a matter of urgency, and recalls the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 69/307 that the Secretary-General reduce the overall environmental footprint of each peacekeeping mission. The Committee looks forward to the Board's observations and recommendations with respect to the effectiveness of the new environmental consultancy arrangement with UNEP in connection with the audit review of peacekeeping**

operations for the period 2015/16. The Advisory Committee comments further on environment-related matters in general in its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742).

10. Global field support strategy

44. The Board addresses matters relating to the global field support strategy in paragraphs 243 to 320 of chapter II of its report, noting that, while progress had been achieved in various aspects of the global field support strategy over the five years of its implementation, significant shortfalls in achieving the end-state vision remained. The Board states that, although governance and performance management had been identified as key elements to be established at the beginning of the implementation period, the end-state vision and the key performance indicators were introduced only in the second and third year of implementation. The Board also indicates that the Global Field Support Strategy Steering Committee did not monitor and review the progress of implementation. Furthermore, progress in the other three pillars was lacking, as key elements of the human resources pillar, such as workforce planning, succession management, filling of vacancies and completion of a monitoring and accountability framework, had yet to be achieved; there were delays in the operationalization of the supply chain management pillar; and services provided through the Regional Service Centre under the shared services pillar were lacking. The Board observed that it was unable to obtain sufficient evidence validating the reported savings arising from the strategy and recommended that the Administration develop a methodology for undertaking cost-benefit analyses that can be empirically verified so that assurance can be provided regarding the benefits that have accrued or are expected to accrue (see also A/70/742, paras. 67-73).

45. The Advisory Committee provided further comments on the global field support strategy in the context of its report on the subject (A/69/874) and its report on cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/742). In the latter report, while noting the overall conclusion of the Board of Auditors that substantial progress had been achieved with respect to the strategy, the Committee expresses its concern over the Board's conclusion that none of the four strategy pillars had fully achieved their desired end-state and that it had not been able to provide the necessary assurances with respect to the reported cost savings attributed to the implementation of the strategy (ibid., para. 73).

E. Costs for external audit services of peacekeeping operations

46. The Advisory Committee was informed by the Secretary-General, upon enquiry, that costs for external audit services of peacekeeping missions were estimated for all missions and then communicated by the Administration to the Board of Auditors. Upon approval of the relevant budgets by the General Assembly, those costs are then allocated accordingly. The Committee was also informed that external audit costs for 2016 and 2017 amounted to $9.2 million, and was provided with a breakdown of the budgeted estimates for each mission for the 2016 and 2017 period, representing 50 per cent of the estimates, or $4.6 million, as set out in the table below.

Annual external audit costs for 2016 and 2017

(United States dollars)

Mission	*Audit cost*
UNIFIL	273 637
UNLB	196 358
UNAMID	408 184
UNSOS	198 683
UNMIK	277 312
MONUSCO	596 598
UNMIL	399 720
MINUSTAH	530 163
UNFICYP	151 242
UNDOF	137 905
MINURSO	137 434
UNOCI	371 028
UNMISS	390 937
UNISFA	132 226
MINUSMA	203 010
MINUSCA	203 010
Total	**4 607 444**

47. The Advisory Committee notes that the audit costs with respect to the Board's forthcoming reviews concerning United Nations peacekeeping operations for the financial period ended 30 June 2016 vary significantly, from $132,226 for UNISFA to $596,598 for MONUSCO. The Committee notes that the fees for MINUSTAH amount to $530,163 for the purposes of auditing the appropriated resources for 2015/16, which amount to $380,355,700. However, in comparison, UNAMID would require only $408,184 for external audit services, despite its significantly higher appropriated resources for 2015/16 in the amount of $1,102,164,700. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the methodology for calculating and apportioning the required resources for external audit services at peacekeeping operations should be clarified, so as to ensure transparency for all stakeholders concerned, including Member States.**

Annex

Expenditure for official travel in peacekeeping operations compared with the initial appropriation approved by the General Assembly for 2014/15

(Millions of United States dollars)

Mission	*Original appropriation (A/C.5/69/17)*	*Apportionment after redeployment*	*Expenditure*	*Variance*	
				Amount	*Percentage*
UNFICYP	0.276	0.276	0.275	0.001	0.36
UNDOF	0.437	0.897	0.935	-0.038	-4.24
UNIFIL	0.914	1.144	1.033	0.111	9.70
MINURSO	0.716	0.716	0.585	0.131	18.30
UNMIK	0.451	0.401	0.428	-0.027	-6.73
MONUSCO	8.832	9.552	9.505	0.047	0.49
UNMIL	2.062	2.062	1.627	0.435	21.10
UNOCI	3.669	3.662	3.367	0.295	8.06
MINUSTAH	4.259	4.689	2.766	1.923	41.01
UNAMID	5.119	7.261	6.641	0.620	8.54
UNISFA	1.283	1.336	1.219	0.117	8.76
UNMISS	6.257	8.307	7.993	0.314	3.78
UNSOA	2.456	3.909	4.458	-0.549	-14.04
MINUSCA	3.721	6.231	6.252	-0.021	-0.34
MINUSMA	3.485	5.699	5.659	0.040	0.70
Support activities					
Support account	10.402	10.433	9.238	1.195	11.45
UNLB (Global Service Centre)	1.000	1.000	1.057	-0.057	-5.70
Total	**55.339**	**67.575**	**63.038**	**4.537**	**6.71**

Abbreviations: MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSTAH, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNAMID, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNLB, United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNMIL, United Nations Mission in Liberia; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; UNOCI, United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire; UNSOA, United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia.

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International drug control

Interaction between the United Nations, national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union

Summary report of the 2016 parliamentary hearing

Note by the President of the General Assembly

The present document contains the summary report of the 2016 parliamentary hearing, held in New York on 8 and 9 February 2016, which is circulated pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/123.

The world drug problem: Taking stock and strengthening the global response

Parliamentary hearing held at United Nations Headquarters: summary report

Opening

1. The hearing served as input to the General Assembly special session, scheduled to be held from 19 to 21 April 2016, to review the implementation of the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, as well as other commitments under three overarching drug control conventions. At the meeting, the views of parliamentarians and other relevant stakeholders from many parts of the world were examined, taking stock of various aspects of the current drug control regime.

2. The two-day session was opened by the President of the United Nations General Assembly, H.E. Mogens Lykketoft, and the President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Hon. Saber Chowdhury. Mr. Lykketoft stressed the contribution that parliamentarians can make to the debate, in three main areas: first, in that they express the views and concerns of their constituents, thus bringing a multitude of voices to the table; secondly, in their responsibility as lawmakers to draft and adopt relevant legal frameworks; and thirdly, in their role as custodians of parliamentary accountability, overseeing the implementation of international commitments and calling for action and answers, when needed.

3. Mr. Chowdhury said that there can evidently be deep political divides in opinions on the appropriate response to the drug problem. In recent years, he explained that we have seen an increasingly forceful debate about the effectiveness of the so-called war on drugs, reflecting significant changes in the way that some people see the issues in the light of the facts on the ground. Noting that no one is immune from addiction, whether to caffeine, alcohol, nicotine, or drugs, he invited delegates to approach the debate non-judgmentally, with compassion and an open mind. He emphasized that drug abuse and addiction should be placed in a public health context, and the several hundred thousand annual drug-related deaths need to be viewed with an eye also on the 8 million annual deaths from tobacco and alcohol combined. He stressed, too, that drug control policy needs to better differentiate among drugs and in production, transit and consumption.

4. Mr. Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) described tackling the world drug problem as essential to promoting healthy and inclusive societies, and as part of the overall efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. He reiterated that preparation for the special session has entailed a comprehensive analytical process, focusing international attention on the existing and emerging challenges, including heroin trafficking, the nexus of organized crime and terrorism; concern about increasing drug consumption in Africa; and the negative impacts of violence on stability and development in Central America. He also said the potential for alternative development to empower poor farmers to break away from illicit cultivation and establish viable livelihoods has not been accurately addressed.

5. Mr. Fedotov added that the three drug conventions all recognize the importance of controlled substances for medical purposes, but problems of availability remain in many parts of the world, with people in severe pain unable to obtain relief or adequate care. Prevention efforts and services for people with drug use disorders also continue to fall short, with only one out of every six drug users globally receiving treatment. The discussions leading to the special session of the General Assembly have emphasized the importance of shared responsibility for these challenges, as well as the need for balanced and comprehensive policies, rooted in the international drug control conventions, including examination of alternatives to conviction for minor drug-related offences, which could reduce prison overcrowding and prevent the recruitment of vulnerable individuals by criminals and extremists. He underlined that such approaches also include robust responses to disrupt organized crime networks, promotion of alternative livelihoods and increased access to essential controlled medicines, while preventing their diversion and abuse. UNODC is assisting Member States to put balanced drug control approaches into action on the ground, through its network of field offices and programmes, under its mandate which encompasses justice, the rule of law and health.

6. All of the opening remarks may be found on the IPU website, at http://ipu.org/Splz-e/unga16.htm.

Keynote address

7. H.E. Ambassador Khaled Shamaa, Chair of the UNGASS Board, began by revisiting the roots of the present drug control regime with the 1912 Opium Convention. That convention was the first to recognize the importance of protecting individuals from drug abuse and dependence while at the same time ensuring access to drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Furthermore, it recognized the transnational nature of the problem and instituted the principle of shared responsibility.

8. From the 1912 Convention, drug control evolved in several stages: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by the 1972 Protocol), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem stated that trafficking and abuse pose a major threat to the health, dignity, hopes and lives of millions of people. The international community will meet in April 2016 to review progress in implementing the Political Declaration and Plan of Action towards an integrated and balanced strategy, and Member States are mandated to agree on operational recommendations, having expressed their grave concern that the world drug problem continues to constitute a serious threat to public health, safety and the well-being of mankind, national security and the sovereignty of States, as well as political stability and sustainable development.

9. According to Ambassador Shamaa, major challenges still persist, and new ones are emerging. It is clear that improved prevention strategies and interventions are needed. In his view, it is also clear that treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration still present a great challenge, whether in the face of shrinking health budgets, or owing to a multitude of health challenges and disease outbreaks in some

areas of the world, together with the need for capacity-building in treatment and rehabilitation, including HIV prevention and treatment. There are challenges from the evolution of criminal activities related to drug trafficking that in many instances go beyond the capacity of States to tackle without international cooperation, including money-laundering, corruption, trafficking of weapons or human beings and the growing nexus of drug trafficking and terrorism, together with the whole issue of how to ensure improved access to controlled substances to alleviate pain and suffering, while preventing their diversion. Drugs are evolving, with new synthetic designer drugs, new psychotropic substances, misuse of pharmaceuticals, and amphetamine-type stimulants. Illicit cultivation of crops still presents a challenge, despite various attempts to address it through alternative development programmes. Greater efforts are needed and such programmes need to be better developed and linked with other endeavours within the broader Sustainable Development Goals.

10. In brief, Ambassador Shamaa said, what we have is a dynamic and evolving international drug control system that needs continuous and determined efforts to implement it, based on its founding principles, and shared responsibility, and taking a balanced and integrated approach.

Discussion

11. The two-day session examined three broad topics:

- The world drug problem in perspective — The evolution of drug control
- The global response to drugs — Can it work more effectively?
- Drug prevention and treatment from the standpoint of sustainable development and human rights — What is required?

12. In three moderated sessions, invited panellists (see annex) offered some thoughts on the topics listed above, after which they responded to a small number of related issues posed by the Moderator, Julia Taylor Kennedy. The discussion was then opened to all participants, who asked questions or raised issues relevant to their countries, with the panellists responding after every two or three interventions.

13. Many delegates described the specific measures their governments had implemented in the bid to solve the drug problem, including drug control commissions; national anti-drug action plans; cooperation and intelligence-sharing with neighbouring countries; campaigns to arrest corrupt police, military and politicians involved in the drug trade; prevention and support for the medical treatment of drug addiction; privatization of social reintegration activities; policies on alternative crops in drug cultivation areas and involvement of other relevant government agencies such as anti-money-laundering bodies, custom officials and more.

14. As the discussions progressed, it became clear that feedback from participants comprised two distinct viewpoints. The question participants could agree on was the content of the present global drug control regime as practiced in most parts of the world, namely a concentration on eradication of illicit drugs and punishment of those involved, whether as producers, traffickers or — in particular — consumers. On the other side, participants questioned the assessment of how successful that regime was proving to be. With differences of nuance specific to each country's

circumstances and characteristics, the two broad views put forward were (i) the present drug control regime is succeeding in its purpose, and should be pursued without significant change, or perhaps intensified; (ii) the drug control regime has failed, not significantly lowering levels of drug use but bringing unintended consequences causing untold societal harm.

The death penalty

The debate on the two perspectives described above reached its greatest level of intensity on the matter of death sentences pronounced on persons apprehended for activities in the drug trade. Participants looked at this in a binary way: either the death penalty was acceptable for certain offences, or it was always wrong.

One delegate asked: "Why, if we are prepared to accept so many deaths from the drug trade — our children and relatives overdosing, our loved ones caught up in drug-related violence, our parents who die in the prison where they have been sent for a minor possession offence — can we not accept that it is right to countenance the execution of those who bring such misery?" For another delegate, on the other hand, the death penalty is always wrong as it diminishes those who administer it and is not proven to work as a deterrent.

15. Thus a fundamental question posed is whether the drug control conventions are flexible enough to accommodate strikingly different views about what are the objectives and effects of the existing policies. However, supporters on both sides also suggested that it is a false dilemma, and that the choice is only between the status quo of prohibition and the opposite extreme of legalization. Some argued that there was a third way, namely through progressively constructing a route to regulation of the use of psychoactive substances, with an emphasis on public health and on human rights.

16. Participants stated that the drug problem is a difficult topic to deal with because they are approaching the debate from such different starting-points, and with such different expectations. As one speaker pointed out, the resultant confusion in the debate is highly beneficial to the people active in the drug trade.

17. Several speakers suggested that each country should be free to interpret the drug control conventions, and to draft relevant domestic law accordingly. However, the contrary view was that it was precisely the lack of cohesion that was contributing to the problem, as some countries (at either national or subnational level) decriminalized certain types of drug possession.

18. Within the two very broad philosophies outlined as (i) and (ii) above, some of the views expressed, whether by panellists or by participants from the floor, included the following:

The "drug control is working" viewpoint:

19. Many participants mentioned that the drug control conventions have the highest rates of ratification among all United Nations treaties and conventions.

There is no need to review the conventions themselves at the United Nations General Assembly special session in April 2016 . Instead, the discussion should focus on strengthening consensus around the existing framework and consolidating and building on existing achievements, while taking account of new trends and facts on the ground and of the particular circumstances and challenges of each Member State. Experience indicates that despite the lapse of time, the three conventions remain very relevant and constitute a solid basis for combating the menace of drugs in all its forms: What is needed is more robust implementation.

20. As mentioned, countries that have signed and ratified the drug control conventions have taken on certain commitments. They are obliged to make it a crime to produce any of the substances listed in the tables drawn up by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). There is no flexibility in that area. However, the conventions do not compel countries to institute prison sentences for drug-related offences. The 1988 Convention does provide that States must establish penalties for drug possession with a view to consumption that does not necessarily entail a prison sentence, and it does stipulate that States can replace or amplify such criminal penalties by care measures.

21. Some countries consider that even within the strict rules of the drug control regime, there is room for flexibility and discretion, for example by encouraging judges to send first-time offenders for treatment, education and rehabilitation, and not incarceration. Flexibility is also given by the provisions on constitutional principles. If a country feels that a convention stipulation is not compatible with its constitutional principles, it may opt out of applying that particular component. Additionally, the conventions provide that specific experiments may be undertaken relating to legalization or criminalization of certain drugs, but impose a limit as to duration and quantity.

22. It is very important that the rule of law is upheld. While it is up to the countries to decide how they may wish to adapt it, to seek to leave the legal framework altogether is to invite major problems. As it was suggested, the dizzying rise in the drug problem began at the end of the Second World War, driven by advertising and consumerism, and fostered by the invented concept of adolescence, which had not existed before. Young people, confused about issues of identity, sought reassurance in groups, including those where peer pressure drove them to try drugs. At the present time, 3.5 per cent of the world population takes drugs, with 2.5 per cent using cannabis. That figure needs to be compared with those for alcohol and tobacco, whose consumption levels are much higher. The world has lost the battle on alcohol and tobacco, but must surely not deliberately lose the battle for control of drugs.

23. The impacts of the drug problem have been unevenly distributed around the world. Although East Asia has the same levels of drug production and trafficking as in Latin America, there is far less associated violence in East Asia. While there has been a strong push in some parts of Latin America for "reform", based on the view that the system has failed (a view shared by some countries in Western Europe), in East Asia and the Middle East there is no such sense of failure and the focus is still on combating use, based on the historical view of use being associated with colonialism, great addiction but minimal violence. Basically, Asia is comfortable with a heavy criminalization approach, seeing no cause for "reform".

Problems of decriminalization

As reported by one participant, until the 1980s, the drug problem was largely unknown in his country. As it began to grow in the country, due to trafficking, the Government decided to impose the death penalty. However, following a public outcry, that law was repealed. Then awareness of drugs began to grow, and people began to go into drug trafficking and grow cannabis. The result was an increase in crime, and more recently in terrorism. The horrible crimes of Boko Haram, such as suicide bombings and mass killings, are only possible because its adherents are out of their minds on drugs. There are voices calling for decriminalization of cannabis, but experience has shown that that is not the solution. In the view of the participant, decriminalization will merely make the drug more available to people who will try it simply because it is not illegal to do so, creating more problems than it will solve. Although decriminalization in this particular context might work in other countries, he does not think that would work in his country and for him the answer is clear: strict penalties for possession and use.

24. Still, according to this viewpoint, legalization of illicit drugs is counterproductive. States must not resort to expedient policies even when unlawful activities become difficult to control. The drug problem is also inextricably intertwined with other organized crime activities such as money-laundering, smuggling of weapons, human trafficking and financing of terrorism. Legalization will also lead to intra-family conflicts, in which adolescents will be able to defy the wishes of their parents that they not take drugs, by claiming that they have a legal right to do so, a right granted by the governments that the parents have elected. It is thus destructive for parents to be lax and encourage policies that make it easier to have access to drugs. Citing Pope Francis, a delegate noted that "Drug addiction is an evil, and with evil there can be no yielding or compromise." Some delegates also noted that "restrictive" policies by government have resulted in lower incidence of drug uses, and thus have benefited societies.

25. Drug-affected developing countries determined to apply the conventions strictly have had to summon the necessary political will, as well as training personnel and establishing effective national strategies. However, most of these countries face serious handicaps, such as a lack of adequate equipment and forensic laboratories, as well as budgetary constraints, necessitating enhanced cooperation from the UNODC and the developed countries of the world. International technical assistance, can be extremely helpful in strengthening countries' national anti-drug legislation.

Fears of abusing the flexibility

According to one delegate from Africa, even though his country has strict laws and institutions, it is known as a transit route for hard drugs, the supply of which is in the hands of a huge and dangerous cartel, able to spread corruption far and wide. From time to time large amounts of these drugs are destroyed, but those who can afford it always manage to buy what they need. For the poor, there is a recently emerging drug, based on alcohol and produced deep in the rural areas. The Government has recently adopted a very vigorous approach of destruction of any facilities found to be producing these alcohol-based narcotics.

In his view, there can be no let-up in the harsh approach to the drug problem. Seeking to inject some flexibility, or applying exceptions for the medical benefits that might be found in cannabis or similar plants, cannot work in Africa and particularly not in his country. It will be abused.

26. One country that has increased its intelligence and policing activities by a considerable margin since 2013 has seen a major rise in arrests for drug possession, which in turn has led to a 32 per cent drop in the number of drug-related crimes. In recent years, more production sites have been found and eliminated, more drugs intercepted before reaching the users and more insight gained into the illegal drugs networks. For that country, the tough "war on drugs" approach has been a success. In addition, other countries have adopted a comprehensive and balanced approach to the drug issue, including focusing on promoting alternative development and livelihoods, which has been effective in their countries.

27. In response to the objection that the existing drug control regime pays insufficient attention to those who are actually profiting from drugs, one speaker described the efforts that her country's treasury is making to monitor atypical purchases of expensive items such as real estate or jewellery, and to compel the purchasers to account for the source of the money. Any items seized under that policy go to help defray the high public health costs of the drug problem.

28. One representative suggested that some countries, including his own, were purely victims of the drug problem. They did not produce drugs, they had no "home-grown" drug problem, but they suffered the effects of illegal trafficking. In his country, drug consumption had recently increased sharply, polluting the entire society, particularly educated youth. It could be beneficial if the IPU and the United Nations were to arrange a special meeting with a view to protecting such victims. The 1988 Convention, in its article 10, commits all signatories to assist and support transit States, especially developing countries and takes direct measures in situations of particular vulnerability. Such countries, if they are signatories to the Convention, can invoke it vis-à-vis the international community to obtain help. It is also possible to take measures at a regional level to create a shared responsibility with respect to specific situations.

Possible drawbacks of lax policy

One participant from Europe noted that after some experimentation in the 1960s and 1970s on legal prescription of narcotics, with disappointing results, his country decided on a total ban on individual possession. It took the view that reducing the quantity of narcotics available in a society must reduce the number of health and societal harms caused by them, and considers that that should also be the approach worldwide. As a result of its repressive drug policy, the number of 16 to 24 year-olds in his country who have tried cannabis is half the average figure for the rest of the European Union.

29. Several participants pointed out that the drug trade has shifted from being a matter of security of persons to becoming a problem of threat to institutions, moving from the margin of society to its power centres. They underscored that society cannot afford to lower its guard and be more flexible about drugs.

The "different approach needed" viewpoint

30. Some of the questions asked by this group were: What has the existing drug control regime given us? Has the huge investment in law enforcement actually had any impact? Has this not come at the sacrifice of prevention and treatment? About 83 per cent of the people in prison for drug-related offences are there because of minor possession, not trafficking. Those in prison for trafficking are, again, the lesser offenders. With mandatory sentences being prescribed for non-violent drug-related crimes, small-time drug offenders are receiving longer terms than those guilty of murder or rape. A disproportionately high percentage of arrests for drug offences are women. Women play a very low-level role in the drug trade, often as "mules", making them easy targets for law enforcement. With the huge numbers of drug users incarcerated, prison overcrowding leads to problems of security, health and disease, and violence.

31. As some participants suggested, the view that the drug control conventions are adequate and only need to be implemented more effectively is an example of ineffective cohesion, of pursuing policies that have not worked for years, but expecting the results to change this time round. Many suggested that, all considered, the conventions represented a major step forward, in particular in the acceptance by countries of shared responsibilities. There is no doubt that the growth in drug production, trade and consumption and the increase in drug-related crime and violence compel countries to enter the present debate aimed at review, reforming and updating the international system. Participants also said that there are shortcomings in access to information, and a need to undertake a thorough analysis of the situation to enable the right political agreements to be made, with agreements reached by consensus rather than imposed from above.

32. Many participants underlined the need to see the drug problem not as an issue of crime and security, but as a matter of public health. In the majority of cases, the public health consequences of drugs can be devastating: not only the direct health effects of the actual ingestion and injection of the narcotics themselves, but also increased user morbidity and mortality, particularly from overdoses; or the spread of

communicable diseases, notably HIV and hepatitis, among needle-sharing injectors. In some rare cases, there have been steps in the direction of a health-based model: in one South American country for example, drug addiction is recognized as a disease, for which treatment is available.

33. The main issue here is that under a policy of drug control based on crop eradication and incarceration for all drug offences, regardless of severity, insufficient treatment is made available, especially and most dramatically in the case of treatment inside prisons for imprisoned addicts. But even in those countries that feel that a new approach is needed, often there are enough resources to provide adequate levels of treatment, often as a consequence of budgetary shortages brought about by past expenditures under the "war on drugs" approach. For delegates supporting the "drug control is working" view, the outcome of the enforcement versus treatment debate is that enforcement is pragmatically the more effective response. For those on the "different approach needed" side, the choice between enforcement and treatment is an ethical issue, one in which they consider that the traditional tough approach has not worked and that a public health-based approach would, but the implementation of that choice is often hampered by financial constraints.

34. Participants added that the drug problem is a symptom of deep-seated malaise in society. It is not an isolated issue of security, but has many other structural aspects that needed to be tackled at the same time. There is institutional weakness, and social vulnerability, which create opportunities for organized crime to engage in trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, and to undertake money-laundering and foster corruption. Tackling all of those problems requires an integrated and systemic approach.

35. At the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly the limits and boundaries of experimentation should be debated. Experimentation is useful, because it allows a diversity of outcomes to be examined in short order. There is much talk of evidence-based policies, but in fact the evidentiary basis for drug policies is very limited, because for decades there has been predominantly one approach that has worked to a limited extent in some parts of the world and basically not at all in others. It is also very important to try to see through the myths surrounding the topic. One speaker said that his country had long nurtured the myth of being only a production country, but looking carefully, it can be seen that it is in fact a consumer country, with grave domestic problems.

36. At the least, there is a basis from which to start experimenting: knowing what has not worked. Incarcerating users does not reduce drug use and produces severe counterproductive effects in terms of public health, human rights, morbidity and mortality of users and social disruption and criminality. There is no evidence that the death penalty has reduced drug trafficking. It is also evident that premature eradication measures, trying to stamp out an illegal economy, such as in some post-conflict countries, before legal production can start generating income and jobs, will fundamentally destabilize the country. An important area for experimentation will be how, without continuing the present negative outcomes, to eradicate narcoterrorism and drug-financed insurgency.

37. Participants underscored the fact that countries have different health systems, as well as monitoring arrangements and understanding of the aspects of the drug problem. Thus, the specific design of policies cannot be identical in every country.

The availability of treatment in some European countries and other pioneers in harm-reduction approaches will perhaps not be mirrored in West Africa, for example.

38. According to some, there is a need to experiment with policing to determine how to make it effective. The violence rates in Latin America are intolerable. It is a sign of the fundamental failure of essential human rights and public security systems. The role of law enforcement is crucial in ensuring that markets, including drug markets, are not associated with high levels of violence and corruption and how actual policing strategies are devised will be very dependent on their local cultural and institutional context. However, there are difficulties in arguing for "whatever policy works", as this appears to be inconsistent with the spirit of the conventions.

39. With the major shift in the late 1970s from a drug control regime aimed at regulating availability and use of controlled substances in medicine, and preventing drug abuse, to one based on criminalization and enforcement as the predominant tools, one of the key outcomes was sentencing both addicts and casual users who were not addicted to long prison terms based on mere possession. That generated devastating social and economic consequences, disruption of families, and very negative repercussions on public health. The sense of profound failure of that sterner policy is one of the key issues currently driving reform. The call for change is coming not only from some reform-minded countries, such as several in Latin America: even in the original prime mover of the present drug control regime, North America, there is a major thrust to move away from the criminalization of non-violent drug offences with a view to unburdening the prison system and achieving better public health outcomes.

40. Proponents of this perspective simultaneously call for a policy based on harm reduction and respect for human rights, one that takes into account all the realities, including the emergence of new synthetic drugs, the increase in cannabis use and in its strength; the rise in the illicit market for prescription drugs, in particular in North America, and in the trade in precursors; and the increase in heroin use, also mainly in North America. Harm reduction has to include the treatment of addicts. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, for example, the provision in some European countries of methadone programmes and safe needle exchanges were highly controversial but they are now largely accepted as a positive way forward.

The social or cultural context of drug use

The classical drug control policies have not only failed to work in general, in some cases they have failed miserably, for specific reasons varying around the world. In the case of one country from the Latin American and Caribbean region, one presenter noted, even people who know its music may be unaware that Rastafarianism is in fact a native structured religion, with rituals, beliefs and social norms, including rules on food preparation and how medicine is dispensed. Cannabis, or ganja as it is called in that country, is of great spiritual importance to that community. Further, the people who have had a relationship with ganja for over two centuries are what would be referred to by other United Nations conventions as native people or people having particular social or cultural nuances which must be understood and protected. Yet in the overall global fight against drugs, people like the Rastafari, especially in rural communities in such countries, are particularly penalized for doing what with the best intentions they do not understand to be a crime.

Over the years the Government has attempted to practice what is expected in terms of enforcing the conventions, but fighting the so-called war on drugs has come at an additional expense for societies and countries with similar heritage. There has to be willingness at the global level for greater understanding of the diversities within societies across the world. That is about honouring the most fundamental tenet of the United Nations, that every human has inalienable rights which must be respected. The drug control regime must find the time, the patience and the sincerity to look beyond what is in the rules, and to identify how flexible systems can be developed which will achieve equitable treatment for the various unique communities around the world. That will be a worthy goal for the special session of the General Assembly of 2016.

In the 14 months since possession of small amounts of ganja was decriminalized in the country referred to, there have been 1,000 fewer arrests per month. One thousand rural youth under 30, and women farmers over 50, who are thus not being taken away from school, families and communities, not being exposed to hardened criminals who have committed crimes with real victims, and not at risk of being recruited into the gangs that have linkages with the countries where harder drugs are produced or consumed.

A similar situation can be observed in another country from the same region. For the indigenous peoples, coca leaf represents culture, health and the tradition of their ancestors. Coca leaf is not cocaine. While preserving the beneficial features of coca leaf, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has eradicated, without outside assistance, massive quantities of cocaine. Seizures of the drug have increased by more than 170 per cent, destruction of producing laboratories by over 220 per cent. Now coca-flavoured non-narcotic foods and drinks are being produced, and consumption is being monitored.

41. The conventions had the objective of a drug-free world, but many people now feel that a drug-free world is not feasible, and note the irony that our materialistic world, determined to resolve people's problems through consumer products, has left many people dissatisfied and seeking escape in the consumption of psychoactive substances.

42. Another new thrust, with which the new Sustainable Development Goals intersect, is the role of development, in particular the need to create more humane and more effective policies for dealing with poor producers of cultivation-based drugs. As one participant said, the "war on drugs" is a war on the poor. There has been a systematic failure of alternative development, but the question is whether that approach was always bound to fail, or has failed owing to a lack of integration into other measures, including the sequencing of crop eradication with the delivery of rural development and job creation. Forced eradication has by and large not been effective and few countries have succeeded in eliminating drug cultivation through eradication only, but at tremendous cost to human rights, the disruption of indigenous ways of life, and through political repression that might not be feasible and is certainly not desirable elsewhere in the world.

43. Participants added that if a more humane approach were to be taken, one in which legal livelihoods allow poor producers to find a way out of criminality, all structural drivers of drug cultivation need to be addressed. A major concern is security where extreme insecurity from militancy or from organized crime is rampant. Such situations will severely compromise the effectiveness of alternative livelihood approaches. In addition to ensuring security, the State, or civil society working with the State, has to address sustainable income, job creation, and human development of the drug-producing communities, which are usually the most marginalized ones, as well as infrastructure and value-added chains. The failure of any of these elements may result in the failure of the entire alternative livelihood effort. Such policies need to become far more comprehensive than in the past, focusing both on targeted development and on broader economic growth, and they need to be sustained for years, at the cost of substantial resources.

44. In the area of narcoterrorism, policies have often emphasized eradication of illicit crops as a mechanism of depriving insurgent and terrorist groups of financial resources. Overwhelmingly, regardless of the region, such policies have been counterproductive. They have intensified insurgency and weakened the bonds between the coca or opium poppy producers and the State. Indeed suspension of illicit crop eradication has often been what enabled the counter-insurgency policies to become more effective.

45. Additionally, it was cited that developed countries should give consideration to providing more compensation to the poor countries working on supply control. Crop eradication is very costly, not only in terms of lost incomes for farmers but also in terms of damage to forests, whose canopy often has to be cut away in order to demonstrate that crops have been eradicated. The resultant negative contribution to climate change is considerable.

46. There is a difference between labour-intensive drug economies, such as poppy- or coca-growing, and non-labour-intensive ones such as drug trafficking or the production of methamphetamines or captagon, in which ISIS is apparently increasingly involved. The costs of disrupting those less labour-intensive illicit economies are lower than the costs of eradicating illicit crops, but such disruption is

also difficult. Very probably, the State will have to prevail against militancy before drugs can be eradicated.

47. An additional consideration raised during the hearing is the blurring of the concept of supply countries versus demand countries. That distinction dominated earlier debates on the drug problem, with discussion of which category bore the greater blame for the drug problem, but now, the reality has fundamentally changed. Now many of the traditional supply or transit countries have become major demand markets, rendering moot the issue of blame assignment, and also calling on law enforcement agencies to revise their operational focus.

Regulation by the Government

One delegate noted that a country from the Latin American and Caribbean region has taken an approach often loosely referred to as "legalization", but which is actually regulation. The entire marijuana trade is under the control of the Government, which places limits on personal cultivation or purchase and sets the price (lower than the traffickers' black market price, in a deliberate strategy to eliminate the role of organized crime). It also records every quantity sold, and keeps genetic information which will allow it to determine whether illegal marijuana is being sold. All sellers and consumers have to register with the Government. The regulation approach also has aspects related to human rights, public health and security. As a result of the new policy, progress can be seen in combating addiction, and the marijuana regulation policy parallels that country's strict anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol laws.

48. It is also important to accept that there may be positive uses found within any of the listed drugs. For example, treatment for glaucoma and another for asthma have been developed based on cannabis. A few participants called for amendments to the conventions to decriminalize plants and substances that in their natural state do not produce any narcotic effect. It is a paradox that the conventions make these natural plants illegal but say nothing about the hundreds of new chemical drugs. The drug control regime should identify what is required across the globe in terms of regulated supply of cannabis, coca, opium, and other substances to provide benefits to humans, notably in the area of pain relief.

49. According to INCB, in more than 80 per cent of the world, the lack of access to controlled medicines for palliative care and dependence treatment and pain, is one of the most troubling unintended consequences of drug control policies. Worldwide, some 5 billion people have no access to opioid dependence treatment to alleviate the pain of late-stage cancers, AIDS or traumatic injury. This is an ethical, public health and human rights scandal.

50. This egregious failure of the system also includes millions of refugees suffering from pain because most host countries remove controlled medicines, including morphine, from emergency kits that the World Health Organization, Doctors Without Borders and others send out, because of the fear of diversion of the medicines for abuse, although there is no evidence that that occurs. Policies are

based on fear, not on data from the field. The way forward for this unintended consequence lies in establishing an evidence base and in the ongoing global education of medical professionals.

51. In many countries, delegates suggested it is a deliberate policy to concentrate on arresting drug users, since that gives impressively high statistics for numbers of drugs-related arrests. Going after a trafficker would have more beneficial effect by mitigating the flow of drugs to multiple users. In other cases, Governments strongly defend their policies on both supply and demand, but fail to provide the resources needed to do so. Thus, the millionaire traffickers remain immune, the average cannabis or coca producer makes a subsistence living, while those at the bottom of the trafficking chain, the "mules", fill the prisons — or, if they have been forced to carry the drugs inside their bodies, may have died in transit if the drugs have escaped from ruptured packages.

52. Participants highlighted that drugs are readily available in prisons, and there is no provision for treatment. Consequently, when imprisoned addicts are released, they are still addicted, and so more likely to return to a life of crime and drug use (if they do not die from an overdose). If a person has turned to drug use owing to difficulties in dealing with life and accepting responsibilities, then keeping that person in prison with no treatment or assistance does nothing to prepare him or her to face up to reality upon release. Also, insufficient funds are being made available for education on the effects of drugs and psychotropic substances.

53. Several participants noted that people who are traumatized and living in situations of tension are very likely to become users, and in many cases addicts, for reasons beyond their control. One speaker from a country with a native population of 7 million that has now absorbed 2 million refugees from countries in conflict pointed out that when such people arrive in another country (which may be suffering economic difficulties of its own) which cannot offer them opportunities to work, they may turn to drugs, whether as traffickers or as users. That is the situation in his country, which has changed from a transit country to a consumer country. The drug problem is now affecting its schools and universities, and the major powers to which it has appealed are not doing enough to help. The drug problem, in turn, is fostering extremism and violence.

54. Criminalization of drug use among refugees is likely to have counterproductive consequences. It is essential that the help supplied by donor countries also include provision for drug treatment. Organizations involved need to become far more knowledgeable than at present about what works in terms of prevention and demand reduction measures. Many of the policies that have been traditionally developed and delivered in many western countries have not been effective, although they may well have been more cost-effective than imprisonment, for example. Also, treatment and prevention policies are more effective when they are tailored to specific subgroups. In addition, so many of the new users that are emerging in the Middle East or in West Africa may be responsive to different types of messages from those that have been seen so far in terms of making prevention and treatment more effective.

Measured approach to decriminalization

One participant noted that in 2001, within the scope of all the drug control conventions that it had signed and ratified, one European country took the decision to decriminalize the acquisition and possession of small amounts of any type of drugs. The country stopped looking at the drug consumer as a criminal, instead just as someone needing help. It was a human rights approach, but in addition and importantly it took the element of crime out of the equation. Drug possession and consumption remain illegal, but in place of the mass incarceration pursued by that country from shortly after the mid-1970s to the end of the century, any user discovered is referred to a Drug Addiction Dissuasion Commission, typically comprising a lawyer, a doctor and a social worker. The commission decides on the disposition of each case, imposing either a fine or community service, or sending the user for treatment, or in many cases imposing no penalty at all. Portugal's approach at the time was controversial among other countries, but in the 16 years of its existence it has to be seen largely as a success. Drug use has gone progressively down, drug-related deaths have dropped and, freed from the fear of arrest and imprisonment, addicts are now much more ready to attend facilities. offering treatment for addiction.

55. One speaker noted that even if a more treatment-based approach is adopted, the drug problem seemed to have been losing priority among political leaders over perhaps the past 10 years. Broken-down societies are causing people to destroy their own lives through the use of drugs, and politicians need to see that that is happening everywhere. Countries must increase the political priority of the issue, but the United Nations needs to step forward and provide the best information for policymakers to devise effective policies, reporting on what has worked where and advising on the right avenues to pursue in the future, underscoring the importance of the day's exchanges and those of the General Assembly special session to come.

56. One speaker from a country with relatively low rates of drug abuse and drug-related crimes suggested that while there is a major concentration on controlling supply, it is very costly and has limitations. It would be preferable to control demand, since as long as there is demand there will be supply. The best way to control demand is to work on the mind, which means that educational institutions, civil society, and religious bodies have a greater role to play in helping to change the people's mindset and teaching them not to think that they can obtain happiness from drugs.

57. Lessons could be learned from countries' experience with two substances not classified as "drugs", but still harmful to health and potentially addictive: alcohol and tobacco. From alcohol, notably the results of prohibition in North America in the 1920s, it could be learned that driving markets for addictive products underground simply empowers organized crime. Criminal organizations in North America notably the Mafia, received an enormous boost from the pronouncement of Prohibition. The issue of tobacco showed the importance of education: the experience of countries such as Canada reveals that education alone, without a

blanket ban, was enough to reduce the consumption of cigarettes and other tobacco products drastically.

58. Finally, several speakers praised the flexibility currently being shown by North America. Learning from its past mistakes in drug policies and also responding to its own domestic changes taking place, it is moving from its role of chief architect and head enforcer of the system, to becoming a leader focusing much more on improving its own policies and allowing for greater flexibility and greater wisdom in the system.

Doha Debate

Session IV followed the pattern of the "Doha debates" popularized by the BBC.

As an exercise intended to sharpen the focus of the issues which had been discussed by the participants in the first three sessions, two invited panellists (see annex) gave a detailed, but short presentation in favour of a motion that encapsulated one side of the great divide that had been revealed in delegates' positions, and two spoke against it. The debaters also responded to questions from the floor, and were finally given the opportunity to make closing remarks.

Two motions were selected to crystallize into one clear "Yes or No" proposition the myriad subtopics and detailed aspects that had been argued so intensely during the first three sessions.

The views expressed both by panellists and by speakers from the floor have been reflected in the body of the present report as they further articulated the opinions given in the preceding three sessions, although in a more concise form and often using more dramatic examples.

Lastly, seeking to quantify the opinion of the room, a non-binding "vote" by show of hands was taken as an exercise to give all participants a final say on the proceedings.

The first motion: *Implementing the international legal framework will address the world drug problem*, was upheld by a slim majority.

The second motion: *States should seek alternatives to incarceration when addressing possession of drugs for personal use*, was pronounced a draw.

It should be noted that up to a quarter of participants were absent from the room at the time of the "vote" and several who were present abstained from voting.

Conclusions

59. The conclusions of the hearing were summarized by Mr. Martin Chungong, Secretary-General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, who observed that although there was no consensus on many of the issues on the table, the hearing did address many misunderstandings and set the stage for further political debate both in

Parliaments and at the United Nations. It also revealed some areas of common ground:

(a) The conventions provide a common baseline and a framework to guide policy in all countries. In this sense, they protect us from the risk of policy "fragmentation" while establishing the base for international cooperation;

(b) There is a clear problem with the narrow way many countries interpret the conventions, without considering the flexibility that is afforded within them. This is the case particularly when it comes to pursuing drug use as a crime. Drug use should be regarded as a health issue first. Several parliaments are moving in that direction with legislation to decriminalize and regulate use and possession, offering various models for others to consider;

(c) On the other hand, during the debate, there were voices of concern that stated that the conventions may not provide sufficient policy space to countries to yield innovative policy solutions. It is also clear that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to the drug problem across countries. Each country's policy must address its own specific circumstances;

(d) What is common to all countries is the need to tackle the root causes of drug use, and not just the effects. It was pointed out that there are many factors that cause social alienation, such as poverty, discrimination, and even the culture of immediate gratification of consumer societies. In many countries, the social fabric needs to be strengthened so that all feel included;

(e) The hearing clearly illustrated the need for a "balanced" approach to drug control policy and clarified various possible understandings of this, of which the main ones are:

(i) Rebalancing law enforcement efforts with treatment, prevention and education efforts. The evidence shows that most resources continue to go towards punishment and prosecution and not enough towards treatment. That trend should be reversed;

(ii) Rebalancing action against producers and users to focus more on trafficking by the cartels and organized criminal organizations. The middlemen are really those who reap most of the profits and do most of the damage in terms of criminal activity and violence. To get to the drug lords and those most responsible for the damage to society, Governments need to "follow the money", in the time-honoured phrase;

(iii) When punishment is used as a deterrent against drug use or production, it needs to be more commensurate with the actual crime. There should not be a uniform blanket way of dealing with all offenders.

60. Overall, the hearing brought to light serious concerns from some as to the effectiveness of the current drug control regime while also highlighting its continued relevance and importance to others. In several cases, the cure has been worse than the disease. The "war on drugs" has done little actually to discourage harmful drug use or advance the "welfare of the people", which is the stated purpose of the conventions.

61. As highlighted during the discussion about the new Sustainable Development Goals, greater emphasis needs to be placed on development measures to tackle the

drug problem. If Governments help people out of poverty, provide health care and education, make institutions more transparent and representative, and indeed proactively implement the Sustainable Development Goals, then they will undercut the drivers of the drug problem. In that regard, some alternative development programmes have demonstrated that success is possible, essentially through political support, mobilization of public resources and close cooperation with farmers and communities. Conversely, going after small drug producers like coca and poppy farmers, or persecuting drug users as criminals, is actually more likely to lead to negative development outcomes, such as the loss of livelihoods, environmental destruction, and indeed the disappearance of traditional ways of life.

62. One of these outcomes that received considerable attention during the meeting has to do with the human, social and economic costs of imprisonment. Women are particularly affected by this because they are often at the bottom of the production and distribution ladder and so more likely to be prosecuted. Any jail term is likely to stigmatize and make life impossible after returning to society, and to employment, especially if there are no resources to facilitate re-entry.

63. It is clear that even within the framework set by the conventions, many countries can do more to align their policy response so as to get better results. Key to this is that countries look at the evidence — i.e., clearly identify the affected populations, the drivers of drug use, the specific circumstances of drug production and more.

64. Too many countries have yet to develop a proper strategy on drugs, and their drug agencies and government departments tend to work in silos. Their response has evolved over time and in a piecemeal way. They need to put their legal framework in order and Parliaments of course will be key to that. The hearing has sent a clear message about the need for each country to perform a comprehensive review of its own drug problem and from there to design an integrated and balanced strategy.

65. The point of departure in this effort can only be the people: they need to be given the information and education to engage in the policy arena and question the social imagery that colours too much of the debate. A comprehensive debate is needed in each country which would engage all citizens and constituencies (users, producers, law enforcement, social sector, and so on) on those questions.

Annex

List of speakers

Opening session

H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly

Hon. Saber Chowdhury, President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

H.E. Mr. Yury Fedotov, Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Session I

The world drug problem in perspective — The evolution of drug control

H.E. Ambassador Khaled Shamaa, Chair of the Board, United Nations General Assembly special session 2016 (Keynote speaker)

Ms. Margarita Stolbizer, Member of Parliament, Chamber of Deputies of Argentina

Mr. Bernard Leroy, Rapporteur, International Narcotics Control Board

Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Brookings Institute

Session II

The global response to drugs — Can it work more effectively?

Ms. Reem Abu Dalbouth, Member of Parliament, House of Representatives of Jordan

Mr. Raymond Pryce, Member of Parliament, House of Representatives of Jamaica

H.E. Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

Mr. Alberto Otarola, Executive President of the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs, Peru

Ms. Andrea Huber, Policy Director, Penal Reform International

Session III

Drug prevention and treatment from the standpoint of sustainable development and human rights — What is required?

Ms. Aasiya Nasir, Member of Parliament, National Assembly of Pakistan

Mr. Javier Sagredo, Advisor, Democratic Governance and Citizen Security, Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, UNDP

Mr. Pedro Jose Arenas Garcia, Observatory Colombian Coca Growers, former Member of Congress of Colombia

Session IV

Doha Debate

Motion 1: *Implementing the international legal framework will address the world drug problem*

For: Mr. Anti Avsan, Member of Parliament, Parliament of Sweden

Mr. Kevin Sabet, President, Sensible Approaches to Marijuana

Against: H.E. Ambassador Luis Alfonso De Alba, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the International Organizations, Vienna

Dr. Kasia Malinowska, Director, Global Drug Policy Programme, Open Society Foundation

Motion 2: *States should seek alternatives to incarceration when addressing possession of drugs for personal use*

For: Ms. Laura Rojas, Senator, Senate of Mexico

Mr. Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Member of Parliament, House of Commons of Canada

Against: Mr. Joshua Lidani, Senator, Chairman Senate Committee on Drugs and Narcotics, Senate of Nigeria

Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Sudan

Closing session

Mr. Martin Chungong, Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly

Hon. Saber Chowdhury, President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

Moderator (all sessions): Ms. Julia Taylor Kennedy

United Nations A/70/805–S/2016/283

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 35
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 28 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 24 March 2016, regarding the thirty-fifth round of the Geneva international discussions (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-05313 (E) 250416

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 28 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the thirty-fifth round of the Geneva international discussions

Tbilisi, 24 March 2016

The thirty-fifth round of the Geneva international discussions was held on 23 March 2016. The participants in the discussions took part, in their individual capacity, in the two working groups, the first focusing on security and stability in the Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, and the other on issues related to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the places of their origin. The discussions were co-chaired by representatives of the European Union, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and attended by participants from Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The Head of the Provisional Administration of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District and the Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, as well as representatives of the Russian occupation regimes in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, took part in the discussions.

The talks were conducted in a dynamic atmosphere. The participants held substantial discussions on all agenda items within both working groups.

Following the lengthy consultations and concentrated efforts, a principled agreement was reached on the restoration of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in Gali, which was very positively assessed by the co-chairs and participants. After a break of four years, the resumption of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism is a serious step forward in terms of providing stability on the ground, which will significantly contribute to the protection of the fundamental rights of the local population as well.

The co-chairs and participants positively appraised the exchange of detainees as an important step towards confidence-building between the war-torn communities. The co-chairs and participants also welcomed the restoration of the tripartite coordination mechanism, where the issues of missing persons are discussed through the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Within the first working group, the participants from Georgia addressed the security situation in the Russian-occupied territories. Particular emphasis was placed on the ongoing militarization process and increasing number of military exercises in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia. Special attention was also paid to the implications of "integration" of Georgia's occupied regions into Russia's military, economic and social space, through the implementation of the so-called "treaties".

The Georgian delegation stressed the necessity of a non-use of force commitment by Russia and the creation of international security arrangements on the ground, in order to ensure the implementation of the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement. This would contribute to achieving transparency on the ground, as well

as to the confidence- and security-building measures. The expert-level working group continued to work on a draft statement on non-use of force.

The participants from Georgia also focused on the developments near the village of Jariasheni in early March. It was emphasized that such incidents further aggravate the already difficult situation of the local population by restricting their freedom of movement and right to property. The Georgian delegation drew special attention to the new discriminatory regulations that have been introduced in the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, which put the rights and freedoms of the remaining Georgian population at serious risk and pose a direct challenge to the stability and security on the ground.

Within the second working group, all issues on the agenda were discussed, including the freedom of movement, the right to education in the native language, the need to protect human rights inside the occupied territories, the return of the internally displaced persons and refugees, humanitarian visits and cooperation in the spheres of cultural heritage and environment protection.

The Georgian participants discussed the grave humanitarian implications of the installation of artificial barriers and the so-called "border" signs along the occupation line. The Georgian delegation also addressed the critically important issue, for the local population, of accessing their farmland without any impediment and underlined the need to respect the local population's rights, inter alia, their property rights. In this context, the Georgian delegation deplored the unacceptable methods of discrimination against the local Georgian population on ethnic grounds under the new regulations adopted by the occupation regimes.

The Georgian delegation also focused on the restrictions on education in the native language in the occupied territories, in particular in the Gali district, and demanded that the right to education in the Georgian language be guaranteed. The Georgian participants further expressed their concern that despite the fact that this issue has been at the centre of international attention during the numerous rounds of the Geneva talks, the situation remains the same.

The Georgian participants and representatives of the international organizations once again underscored the need for international monitoring on the ground.

Discussions on the issue of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees were also held. The Georgian delegation, along with the international organizations, requested that substantial, result-oriented negotiations on this important issue be held.

The participants underlined the need to work together with a view to protecting common cultural heritage. The topics of discussion also included the issue of supplying the local population with natural gas. The Georgian side reaffirmed its readiness to supply natural gas to the Akhalgori population. This offer had been repeatedly made by the Georgian side before but, unfortunately, was rejected by some participants.

The thirty-sixth round of the Geneva international discussions will be held on 14 and 15 June 2016.

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Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 13 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to draw your attention to the continued policy of deadly ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces and to the violations recorded for the month of February 2016 (see annex).

The leadership of Azerbaijan continues to escalate the situation on the ground at an alarming rate and with more powerful weaponry, including tanks, howitzers and anti-aircraft artillery, which has caused casualties, including among the civilian population.

During the reporting period, hostile Azerbaijani military activities resulted in the death of a military serviceperson, Simon Chavroshyan, and a civilian, Hakob Hambarcumyan, while soldiers Aram Atoyan, Karen Araqeljan, Arman Davtyan, Argishti Gapoyan, Ara Hovhannisyan, Roman Harutyunyan, Arman Shamkhalyan, Melsik Sargsyan and Igit Sahakyan were wounded.

Armenia reiterates that clear and unequivocal commitment to the ceasefire regime and confidence-building by the parties concerned is of the utmost importance for creating an environment conducive to the peace process.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-05320 (E) 050416

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Annex to the letter dated 13 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-29 February 2016

In the framework of informational exchange between the Ministries of Defence of the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic according to the operation data received from the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1. On the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh:

   Total number of incidents: 1,974
   Total number of shots: 31,476

   Small arms and light weapons (5.45-7.62 mm): 28,655; sniper weapons (7.62 mm): 1,522; large-calibre sniper weapons (12.7-14.5 mm): 485; large-calibre machine guns (12.7-14.5 mm): 592; grenade launchers (30-40 mm): 47, multiple-launch rocket system (TR-107 mm): 2; small-calibre mortars (60-82 mm): 165.

2. On the border with the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of incidents: 316
   Total number of shots: 4,411

   Small arms and light weapons (5.45-7.62 mm): 3,124; sniper weapons (7.62 mm): 556; large-calibre sniper weapons (12.7-14.5 mm): 265; large-calibre machine guns (12.7-14.5 mm): 412; grenade launchers (30-40 mm): 9; small-calibre mortars (60-82 mm): 10; large-calibre mortars (120 mm): 35.

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
1.	1 February	Berkaber	0855	Small arms	5	1. At 1420, near the village of Gyulistan, on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh, soldier Aram Atoyan was wounded while in a car by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
2.			1020	Sniper weapon	3	
3.			1040		2	
4.			1715	Large-calibre sniper weapon	6	
5.			1955	Small arms	20	
6.		Aygepar	1140	Sniper weapon	1	2. At 1515, near the village of Karvend, on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh, soldier Karen Araqeljan received shrapnel wounds from the Azerbaijani side.
7.			1320		1	
8.		Chinari	1310	Small-calibre mortars	3	
9.			2120	Small arms	2	
10.		Movses	2105		2	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
11.	2 February	Chinari	1120	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
12.			1150		2	
13.			1410		6	
14.		Aygepar	1710	Sniper weapon	1	
15.		Baghanis	1750	Small arms	8	
16.	3 February	Berkaber	0020	Small arms	15	
				Sniper weapon	3	
17.			1110	Large-calibre sniper weapon	20	
18.			1130	Grenade launcher	3	
19.			1655	Sniper weapon	12	
20.		Yeraskh	1620	Small arms	1	
21.		Aygepar	1730	Small arms	1	
22.			1815	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
23.		Berdavan	1815	Small arms	10	
24.		Vazashen	2110		30	
25.	4 February	Yeraskh	0020	Small arms	1	
26.			2120		1	
27.			2130		1	
28.		Chinari	0120	Small arms	30	
				Sniper weapon	7	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	8	
29.			0130	Small arms	50	
				Sniper weapon	10	
30.			0925	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
31.			1130	Large-calibre machine gun	6	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
32.			1730	Small arms	25	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
33.			2030	Small arms	10	
34.					7	
35.			2030	Small arms	15	
36.		Berdavan	0340	Small arms	15	
37.		Movses	1005	Sniper weapon	3	
38.			1200	Large-calibre machine gun	14	
39.		Aygepar	1010-1020	Small arms	15	
40.				Large-calibre sniper weapon	8	
41.			1150	Sniper weapon	6	
42.			1135	Small arms	12	
43.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1030-1100	Small arms	36	
44.		Aygedzor	1105	Sniper weapon	15	
45.			1820	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
46.		Berkaber	1330	Small arms	4	
47.			1410		20	
48.			2255		15	
49.		Koti	1345	Sniper weapon	5	
50.		Koti	1345	Small arms	15	
51.		Barekamavan	1545	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
52.			1730	Large-calibre machine gun	20	
53.		Paravakar	2305	Small arms	28	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
54.	5 February	Aygepar	0920		6	1. At 0355, near the village of Ashaghi Abdurakhmanly, on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh, soldier Simon Chavroshyan was killed by fire from the Azerbaijani side. 2. At 1200, near the village of Talish, on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh, soldiers Arman Davtyan, Argishti Gapoyan, Ara Hovhannisyan and Roman Harutyunyan received shrapnel wounds and a military car was damaged by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
55.		Chinari	0930	Small arms	25	
56.			1230	Large-calibre machine gun	5	
57.		Koti	1020	Large-calibre machine guns	10	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
58.		Aygedzor	1055	Sniper weapon	20	
59.		Aygedzor	1145		10	
60.		Berkaber	1155	Sniper weapon	4	
61.			1310		1	
62.			1415	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
63.			2005	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
				Small arms	10	
64.		Movses	1425	Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	
65.			1830	Small arms	3	
66.	6 February	Yeraskh	0040	Small arms	1	
67.		Chinari	0100	Sniper weapon	2	
68.			2125		10	
69.			2205		35	
70.			2215	Small arms	44	
71.				Sniper weapon	1	
72.			2230	Small arms	100	
73.			2235		3	
74.		Aygedzor	0830	Sniper weapon	10	
75.		Movses	0955		6	
76.		Aygepar	1015		6	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
77.		Dovegh	1220		10	
78.		Vazashen	1500	Small arms	6	
79.		Berdavan	1730	Sniper weapon	6	
80.	7 February	Paravaqar	0025	Small arms	5	
81.		Aygedzor	0140	Sniper weapon	5	
82.		Berkaber	0230	Small-calibre mortar	15	
83.			0240		15	
84.			0420	Small arms	10	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
85.			2250	Small arms	10	
86.		Movses	1245	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
87.		Berdavan	1510	Small-calibre mortar	2	
88.		Agarak	1730	Small arms	5	
89.		Yeraskh	2030		1	
90.			2145		1	
91.		Aygepar	2145	Sniper weapon	2	
92.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2310	Small arms	4	
93.	8 February	Berkaber	1315	Sniper weapon	3	
94.		Yeraskh	1325	Small arms	1	
95.			2220		1	
96.		Movses	1715		2	
97.	9 February	Berkaber	0825	Small arms	10	
98.		Chinari	1350	Sniper weapon	5	
99.		Vazashen	1500	Small arms	6	
100.		Vahan	2125	Large-calibre sniper weapon	20	
				Small arms	50	
101.			2240	Small arms	15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
102.	10 February	Chinari	0255	Small arms	1	
103.		Movses	1135	Sniper weapon	1	
104.			1520	Small arms	2	
105.		Berdavan	2140	Small arms	20	
106.	11 February	Yeraskh	0050	Small arms	1	1. At 1015, near the village of Talish, on the line of contact with NK, soldiers Arman Shamkhalyan and Melsik Sargsyan were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
107.		Movses	0830	Sniper weapon	1	
108.		Berkaber	1540	Small-calibre mortar	2	
109.			1620		4	
110.		Chinari	1840	Large-calibre sniper weapon	30	
111.			1840	Small arms	50	2. At 0315, near the village of Yusifjanli, on the line of contact with NK, soldier Igit Sahakyan received gunshot wounds from the Azerbaijani side.
112.		Vazashen	1950	Small-calibre mortar	2	
113.			2045	Sniper weapon	10	
						3. At 1600, near the village of Ashagi Veysali, on the line of contact with NK, shepherd Hakob Hambarcumyan was killed in a garden by fire from Azerbaijani side.
114.	12 February	Chinari	0215	Sniper weapon	1	
115.			0950	Small arms	4	
116.			1030	Small arms	10	
				Sniper weapon	4	
117.			1030	Sniper weapon	8	
118.			1050		10	
119.			1110		13	
120.			1110	Small arms	35	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
121.			1113	Sniper weapon	9	
122.			1117		6	
123.			1800	Small arms	10	
124.		Aygedzor	0920	Small arms	25	
					20	
125.			1220	Small arms	10	
126.			1715	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
				Sniper weapon	15	
127.			2115	Small arms	20	
128.			2130	Small arms	10	
					20	
129.			2215	Small arms	10	
130.		Kayan	1130	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
131.			1405		5	
132.			1705	Small arms	15	
133.		Paravakar	1430	Large-calibre machine gun	4	
134.		Vazashen	1450	Grenade launcher	4	
135.			2000	Small arms	10	
136.			2040		10	
137.		Aygehovit	1715	Small arms	10	
138.			2040		15	
139.	13 February	Aygedzor	1115	Sniper weapon	3	
				Small arms	15	
140.		Aygedzor	1130	Small arms	15	
					20	
141.			1140	Small arms	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
142.			1315	Small arms	20	
				Sniper weapon	10	
143.			1710	Sniper weapon	4	
144.			1715		3	
145.		Paravakar	1235	Small arms	4	
146.			1740		3	
147.		Voskevan	1345	Sniper weapon	5	
				Small arms	25	
148.			1355	Small arms	30	
149.		Baghanis	1345	Small arms	20	
				Sniper weapon	7	
150.		Movses	1625	Small arms	10	
151.			1715	Small arms	10	
152.		Chinari	2000	Sniper weapon	2	
153.	14 February	Aygedzor	0105	Sniper weapon	2	
154.		Berkaber	2040	Small arms	15	
155.			2255		3	
					20	
156.	15 February	Chinari	0920	Sniper weapon	2	
157.			1350		2	
158.		Berdavan	1120	Small arms	100	
159.		Berkaber	1140	Sniper weapon	3	
160.			1450		4	
161.			1457		3	
162.		Geghamasar	2035	Large-calibre sniper weapon	9	
163.	16 February	Koti	0040	Small arms	20	
164.		Baghanis	0055		60	
165.			1800		20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
166.		Yeraskh	0105		1	
167.			2020		1	
168.		Vazashen	0340		15	
169.		Chambarak	1430	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
170.		Chinari	1700	Small arms	15	
171.		Berkaber	1710	Small arms	20	
172.			2010		20	
173.			2050		15	
174.		Agarak	1930		10	
175.		Berdavan	2320		5	
176.	17 February	Chinari	0000	Sniper weapon	3	
177.			0050		2	
178.			0125		3	
179.			0130		17	
180.		Aygedzor	0010	Small arms	6	
181.			0010		3	
182.			2100		14	
183.		Berkaber	0200		15	
					20	
184.			2330		10	
185.		Yeraskh	0330		1	
186.		Voskevan	1230	Small arms	20	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
				Small arms	15	
187.		Pambak	1400	Small arms	2	
188.		Kayan	1440	Sniper weapon	8	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
189.			1444	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
190.			2030		2	
191.			2000	Small arms	3	
192.			2200	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
193.		Aygehovit	1718	Sniper weapon	2	
194.			2000	Small arms	3	
195.		Jil	1755	Large-calibre machine gun	3	
196.			2230	Small arms	9	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
197.		Aygepar	1810	Small arms	2	
198.	18 February	Aygepar	0950	Sniper weapon	6	
199.			1030		26	
200.			1050	Small arms	30	
			1050		20	
201.		Aygepar	1125	Small arms	12	
202.			2010	Sniper weapon	1	
203.		Movses	1105	Sniper weapon	5	
204.			1855	Small arms	1	
205.		Berkaber	1210		10	
206.		Vazashen	1325	Grenade launcher	2	
207.			2146	Small arms	10	
208.		Khndzorut	1530	Small arms	20	
209.		Chinari	1550	Small arms	5	
210.			1605	Sniper weapon	1	
211.			1830	Small arms	15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
212.		Koti	1630	Small arms	200	
213.		Paravakar	1710		30	
214.		Kayan	2030		4	
215.		Aygedzor	2240		25	
216.	19 February	Paravakar	0010	Sniper weapon	6	
217.		Aygepar	0915		1	
218.			1055		1	
219.		Movses	1050	Small arms	5	
220.			1050		5	
221.		Chinari	1310	Sniper weapon	1	
222.		Berdavan	1440	Small arms	20	
223.	20 February	Aygepar	1720	Sniper weapon	1	
224.		Berkaber	2240	Small arms	2	
225.			2300	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
226.		Vazashen	2315	Small arms	4	
227.	21 February	Vazashen	0115	Small arms	10	
					8	
228.			2250	Sniper weapon	3	
				Small arms	8	
229.		Paravakar	2015	Small arms	2	
230.		Chinari	2150	Small arms	9	
231.			2200	Sniper weapon	1	
232.		Berkaber	2210	Small arms	4	
233.		Yeraskh	2220	Small arms	1	
234.			2225		1	
235.			2235		1	
236.	22 February	Movses	0910	Small arms	4	
237.		Berqaber	1510	Sniper weapon	3	
238.			2235	Small arms	4	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
239.		Baghanis	1825	Small arms	20	
240.		Aygehovit	2005		5	
241.		Paravakar	2210		25	
242.		Barekamavan	2140		40	
243.		Agarak	2235		30	
244.	23 February	Vazashen	1330	Small arms	25	
245.			2207		15	
246.			2320		10	
247.		Kayan	1450	Sniper weapon	4	
248.			1935		5	
249.			2300	Small arms	30	
					60	
250.		Aygedzor	2010	Sniper weapon	10	
251.		Chinari	2020	Small arms	3	
252.			2200		25	
253.		Aygehovit	2300		4	
254.			2315		40	
255.	24 February	Berkaber	1025	Sniper weapon	10	
256.			1345		2	
257.			2035	Sniper weapon	1	
				Small arms	30	
258.		Vazashen	1120	Small arms	28	
259.				Sniper weapon	10	
260.		Aygedzor	1125	Sniper weapon	8	
261.			1855	Large-calibre machine gun	30	
262.	25 February	Khndzorut	0048	Small arms	50	
263.		Vazashen	0510	Large-calibre sniper weapon	30	
264.		Berkaber	0945	Sniper weapon	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
265.		Aygepar	1015	Small arms	5	
266.			1035-1115	Small arms	35	
267.		Aygedzor	1115	Large-calibre machine gun	30	
268.			1250	Small arms	5	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
269.			1940	Large-calibre machine gun	280	
270.		Chinari	1115	Small arms	15	
271.			1200	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
272.			2350	Small arms	3	
273.		Paravakar	1300	Small arms	5	
274.		Movses	1400	Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
275.			1410	Small arms	5	
276.		Koti	1410	Small arms	20	
277.	26 February	Berkaber	0130-0145	Small arms	15	
				Sniper weapon	5	
278.			1030	Small arms	10	
279.			1030	Sniper weapon	10	
280.			2230	Small arms	20	
281.		Khndzorut	1230	Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	
282.		Bardzruni	1345	Small arms	5	
					3	
283.		Aygepar	1720		1	
284.		Vahan	1925	Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
				Small arms	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
285.			1935	Small-calibre mortar	2	
286.				Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
287.		Chambarak	2040	Small arms	20	
288.			2230		30	
289.		Kayan	2110		3	
290.	27 February	Kayan	0940	Sniper weapon	10	
291.		Khndzorut	1010	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
292.		Chinari	1540		12	
293.		Aygepar	2000	Small arms	30	
294.		Aygedzor	2105		70	
295.		Berdavan	2105		25	
					30	
296.		Aygehovit	2135	Sniper weapon	2	
297.		Pambak	2205	Small arms	5	
298.		Vazashen	2205		3	
299.		Vahan	2210	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
300.	28 February	Aygepar	1330	Small arms	2	
301.		Aygedzor	1505	Small arms	15	
				Large-calibre machine gun	10	
302.		Aygehovit	1535	Sniper weapon	2	
303.		Vazashen	1625	Small arms	8	
304.		Chinari	1730	Sniper weapon	7	
305.		Berkaber	1755	Sniper weapon	2	
306.			2019		1	
307.			2143	Small arms	40	
308.			2322		10	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
309.			2322		20	
310.	29 February	Chinari	1210	Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
311.		Aygehovit	1245	Sniper weapon	3	
312.		Ttujur	1620	Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	
313.		Voskevan	1640	Sniper weapon	10	
314.		Aygedzor	1900	Small arms	40	
				Sniper weapon	10	
315.		Paravakar		Small arms	10	
316.		Berdavan	2225	Small arms	10	

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 28 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the occasion of the second anniversary of the adoption of the General Assembly resolution "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-05332 (E) 250416

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Annex to the letter dated 28 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the occasion of the second anniversary of the adoption of the General Assembly resolution "Territorial integrity of Ukraine"

27 March 2016

Two years ago, the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, with 100 votes in favour to 11 against (including Russia), adopted the resolution "Territorial integrity of Ukraine", thus confirming Ukraine's sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

Calling upon all States to desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine's borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful means, the resolution has become yet more evidence of full support by the entire international community to Ukraine, which became a victim of Russia's military aggression.

It is regrettable that after this clear verdict of the international community, Russia did not return to the law of civilized nations. Moreover, the Moscow government continues to persist in its most flagrant violations of international law by continuing the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as well as its military invasion in the Ukrainian Donbas region.

Over the past two years of illegal occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation continued blatantly infringing on the human rights of its residents, including the Crimean Tatars — the indigenous people of the Crimean Peninsula.

Ukraine will take all necessary steps, in line with international law, to counter the Russian aggression, restore Ukraine's territorial integrity and ensure that Russia makes full reparation for the injury caused by its wrongful acts.

The General Assembly resolution remains the key instrument for the de-occupation of Crimea, and Ukraine is looking forward to further consolidating the support of the international community for its efforts in restoring the territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

United Nations A/70/808

General Assembly

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Seventieth session
Agenda item 70 (a)
Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance: elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Letter dated 30 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the parliaments of States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I would be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 70 (a).

(*Signed*) B. **Churkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-06593 (E) 220416 220416

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Annex to the letter dated 30 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Sixth convocation of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Statement of 18 March 2016 to the parliaments of States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation are outraged by the latest attempt to justify Nazism and to glorify Nazi war criminals and their accomplices, an attempt which has been made by the inheritors of the fascist ideology in Latvia and their sponsors, some of whom are in Brussels.

On 16 March 2016, former members of Latvian military Waffen SS groups, who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition, held yet another march in Riga, the capital of Latvia — a European Union State that purports to share the ideals, goals and principles of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including in the area of combating neo-Nazism in all its forms and manifestations. The participants in these commemorative events included not only former members of the SS, but also their spiritual successors from a group of activists in marginal neo-Nazi and nationalist parties and movements in the Baltic States and, most disturbingly, representatives of parliamentary parties in Latvia.

The organizers showed particular cynicism in holding a march to commemorate the events of 16 March 1944, the day when units of Latvian soldiers, who had previously carried out auxiliary and police duties, including punitive measures and security duties at fascist concentration camps, first fought against Red Army units on the territory of Pskov province.

Attempts to whitewash the crimes of former members of Latvian Waffen SS military units and to allege that they, while fighting on the side of Hitler's Germany, were carrying out a national liberation mission, are blasphemous, contrary to historical fact and indefensible.

The Nuremberg Tribunal, whose rulings are not subject to review, set out a number of fundamental principles of contemporary international law and made it clear that all members of the SS organization, including the Waffen SS, should be condemned.

The deputies of the State Duma are convinced that an action that is so cynical and offensive to the memory of the millions of victims of SS punitive measures was possible only with the acquiescence of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which Latvia is a member, and with the tacit support of politicians in Europe and the United States of America who are attempting to use the political legacy of Nazism for their own opportunistic and anti-Russian purposes.

The State Duma calls on the parliaments of the States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to condemn the actions of the Latvian authorities who are actually supporting former SS members and their

sympathizers; and to work together in defence of the ideals for which millions of members of the anti-Hitler coalition laid down their lives during the Second World War.

In the year of the seventieth anniversary of the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, this calls serves as an alarm, as a reminder of the lessons of the War and as a deterrent to warmongering.

S. E. **Naryshkin**
Chairman
State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

United Nations A/70/809–S/2016/300

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Security Council

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Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 31 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to my letter dated 7 March 2016 to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/216), in which Djibouti expressed deep concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of the mediation agreement under the auspices of the State of Qatar, I wish to inform you about some encouraging developments as regards the release of only 4 of the 19 Djibouti prisoners of war still in the custody of Eritrea, incommunicado and in the most inhumane and degrading conditions, for the past eight years. By contrast, Djibouti fully accounted for the 19 Eritrean prisoners of war in its custody, treated them humanely and facilitated access to them by the Red Cross.

The Government of Djibouti would like to state that this is just the beginning of a process that we hope signals a radical change in the behaviour of the State of Eritrea, so far characterized by denial, procrastination and obfuscation.

The Government of the Republic of Djibouti has expressed its sincere gratitude to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, for the crucial role he played in the release of those four Djibouti prisoners and indeed for his tireless efforts in his endeavour to help mediate between Djibouti and Eritrea with the ultimate goal of reaching a final and binding agreement. However, 15 Djiboutian prisoners of war are still unaccounted for, and we renew our demand for their immediate release.

We seize this opportunity to also thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his message and the distinguished Member States and organizations which, while welcoming this development, have reiterated the demand of the Security Council that Eritrea release the remaining prisoners held in its custody and scrupulously and expeditiously implement in good faith the 6 June 2010 agreement concluded under the auspices of the Emir of Qatar.

Djibouti wishes to inform you and the distinguished Members of the United Nations that it is grateful to the Emir of Qatar and the Government of Qatar for their efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea in accordance with international law. Djibouti applauds these efforts and

pledges to do all in its power to help them succeed. Towards that end, Djibouti has submitted to the Emir of Qatar a comprehensive statement of pertinent facts and legal principles applicable to this matter. Djibouti urges Eritrea to honour its international obligations and its commitment to fully cooperate with the Emir of Qatar in his selfless efforts to help the parties reach a final and binding determination of the boundary between Djibouti and Eritrea and of the other matters that form part of the dispute, based on international law. With regard to its support for armed bands seeking to overthrow and destabilize the Government of Djibouti, in violation of its obligations under Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law, as well as its obligations under several Security Council resolutions, Djibouti urges Eritrea to permanently cease and desist from such activities.

I would be most grateful if the present letter could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed Siad **Doualeh**